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Abstract 
Researcher: Israel A. Moguel 
Title:  Bio-Inspired Mechanism for Aircraft Assessment Under  
Upset Conditions 
 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering 
Year:  2014 
Based on the artificial immune systems paradigm and a hierarchical multi-self strategy, a set 
of algorithms for aircraft sub-systems failure detection, identification, evaluation and flight 
envelope estimation has been developed and implemented. Data from a six degrees-of-freedom 
flight simulator were used to define a large set of 2-dimensional self/non-self projections as well 
as for the generation of antibodies and identifiers designated for health assessment of an aircraft 
under upset conditions. The methodology presented in this paper classifies and quantifies the 
type and severity of a broad number of aircraft actuators, sensors, engine and structural 
component failures. In addition, the impact of these upset conditions on the flight envelope is 
estimated using nominal test data. Based on immune negative and positive selection 
mechanisms, a heuristic selection of sub-selves and the formulation of a mapping- based 
algorithm capable of selectively capturing the dynamic fingerprint of upset conditions is 
implemented. The performance of the approach is assessed in terms of detection and 
identification rates, false alarms, and correct prediction of flight envelope reduction with respect 
to specific states. Furthermore, this methodology is implemented in flight test by using an 
unmanned aerial vehicle subjected to nominal and four different abnormal flight conditions 
instrumented with a low cost microcontroller.        
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 Aircraft operational safety is the most important objective in the aerospace engineering 
community [1, 2]. The improvements in post-failure flight integrity and safety have become an 
essential asset of high importance in military and civil aircrafts. In recent years, numerous 
research efforts have focused on the development of fault-tolerant flight control systems that 
offer a comprehensive, highly effective and integrated solution to the aircrafts sub-system failure 
detection, identification and evaluation (FDIE) problem [3,4]. One of the most promising 
candidates that offers a solution to this problem is the Artificial Immune System (AIS) model [4, 
5]. Integrated high-performance AIS-FDI schemes have shown in the past their capability of 
handling several categories of aircraft sub-system upset conditions over extended areas of the 
flight envelope while maintaining high levels of performance and control of the aircraft [6-8].  
 The AIS approach for FDIE investigated in this research effort is based on a Hierarchical 
Multi-Self Strategy (HMS), which dictates that a specific set of parameters or “features” may 
favor the detection of some particular failures [9]. This approach relies on the availability of 
large amounts of experimental data at nominal conditions that represent the “self” in the hyper-
space. These data are also used to generate sets of “detectors” that cover the remaining regions of 
the hyper-space called “non-self”. A predefined set of features or variables must be determined 
prior to the generation of “detectors”. These features must be capable of capturing the dynamic 
fingerprint for various sub-system failures. The selection of appropriate features to build the 
“self” and “non-self” in the hyper-space is a crucial step for the effectiveness of the AIS-FDIE 
scheme. It has been shown in previous research efforts that the selection of features that define 
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the self/non-self can be reduced to aircraft variables, pilot inputs, variables generated within the 
control laws and derived variables  
 The “detection” phase represents the process of declaring a generic failure in one or more 
of the aircraft sub-systems. The systems can be classified as actuators, sensors, propulsion or 
structural elements. The detection phase must be designed thoroughly and it must cover aspects 
such as the aircraft’s operational envelope, the sub-system targeted, and the nature and type of 
the abnormal conditions that are expected to be detected. With all this considered, a detection 
logic must be designed for real time operation with high detection rates and low false alarm 
rates.   
 Once a failure has been detected, the “identification” phase starts. The identification 
phase determines which sub-system has failed by analyzing which of the detectors has been 
activated through a positive selection-type (PS) scheme. In this phase, all the detectors are 
labeled in a previous offline process in order to assign specific detectors to particular categories 
of failures. This off-line process or “structuring” consists of outlining which non-selves are 
activated under a specific failure. Depending on the complexity of the targeted systems, the 
identification process can determine which sub-systems have failed (i.e. actuator, sensor, 
structural, etc.). 
 The evaluation phase can be divided into two steps, namely direct evaluation and indirect 
evaluation. Furthermore, the direct evaluation phase can be classified into qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation. The direct qualitative evaluation phase isolates and determines the 
specific subsystem that has failed (i.e. Left Aileron, Right Aileron, Right Engine, Left Wing 
etc.). The quantitative evaluation phase determines the severity or magnitude of a failed 
subsystem. In other words, it can determine at which position a control surface is locked or the 
14 
  
percentage of structural damage that a wing has suffered. Finally, the indirect evaluation phase 
determines the effect on the flight envelope maneuverability and performance of the system after 
a failure has affected the system.  
 In this research effort, two-dimensional projections (meaning two features per self) of the 
self/non-self were created and investigated. Extensive sets of experimental data were clustered, 
fused and later processed into detectors by a process called the “Cluster Set Union Method” 
(CSUM) [10]. The process of generating detectors requires an adequate numerical representation 
of the self/non-self and adequate data processing such that they are manageable given the 
hardware limitations [10]. A total of 496 two-dimensional selves were used to generate the 
corresponding sets of detectors. Their performance was analyzed in terms of detection rate (DR) 
and false alarms (FA). The detection rate was computed as a percentage of all data samples that 
triggered a detector in the presence of an abnormal condition. Similarly, false alarms were 
computed as the percentage of all data samples that triggered a detector at nominal conditions. 
Similarly, the identification phases investigated presents a Structured Non-Self approach in 
which the direct evaluation stage is integrated into a single algorithm in which the performance 
of the algorithms is analyzed in terms of correct and incorrect identification [10].   
 In addition to this research effort, the application of artificial neural networks (ANN) for 
FDIE purposes in real time is also investigated through flight tests. A “model following” 
architecture is used to generate reference flight commands that satisfy desired handling qualities. 
The reference signals are processed by the ANN, which calculates and estimates angular rates on 
the three body axes (roll, pitch, and yaw) within an “open-loop” approach. The ANN 
investigated possess’ the capability to capture the dynamic fingerprint of the aircraft as well as 
the dynamic fingerprint produced by sub-systems failures. This characteristic gives the ANN an 
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immense potential for self definition and FDI. The output parameters of the ANN combined with 
other features are considered in order to define and generate “selves”.  
 The neural network (NN) algorithm investigated in this effort is an “Adaptive Linear 
Neuron (ADALINE) network. In this effort, two networks working in parallel have been 
implemented on each of the three channels. This approach enhances the performance of the 
network without the computational burden.   
 This thesis was part of a research project funded by DARPA as a group effort between 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) and West Virginia University (WVU) graduate 
students and faculty. 
 The thesis document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the methodology and 
algorithms used for the generation of detectors as well as the simulation environment. Chapter 3 
presents the methodology and algorithms used in the identification phase. Chapter 4 is dedicated 
to the definition and the process of estimating the flight envelope reduction process. In Chapter 
5, the definition and description of the ANN investigated and the model following control is 
presented. Chapter 6 describes the flight test program and the results obtained. A conclusion of 
the project and recommendations for future work is provided in Chapter 7.  
 The research effort presented in this thesis has resulted in the publication or submission 
of: 
Journals 
Moguel, I., Moncayo, H., Perhinschi M. G., Perez, Andres., Al Azzawi, D., Togayev, A., 
Structured Non-Self Approach for Aircraft Failure Identification within an Immunity-Based 
Fault Tolerance Architecture, Submitted to EIEEE Journal Transaction in Aerospace and 
Electronics Systems, 2014. 
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Perhinschi M. G., Moncayo H., Al Azzawi, D., Moguel, I., Generation of Artificial Immune 
System Antibodies Using Raw Data and Cluster Set Union, International Journal of Immune 
Computation, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1 ~15, 2014 
 
Conference proceedings 
Moguel I., Moncayo H., Perhinschi M. G., Perez A. E., Al Azzawi D., Togayev A., Bio-Inspired 
Approach for Aircraft Health Assessment and Flight Envelope Estimation, abstract submitted to 
ASME Annual Dynamic Systems and Control Conference, San Antonio, Texas, Oct. 2014 
Moguel I., Moncayo H., Perhinschi M. G., Al Azzawi D., Perez A. E., Togayev A., Biologically-
Inspired Approach for Aircraft Management under Upset Conditions, accepted for presentation 
at International Conference and Exhibition on Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Sept. 2014 
Perez A. E., Moguel I., Moncayo H., Chong C. May; Low Cost Autopilot System for an 
Autonomous Unmanned Aerial System, accepted for presentation at International Conference and 
Exhibition on Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Sept. 2014 
Al Azzawi D., Perhinschi M. G., Togayev A., Moncayo H., Moguel I., Perez A. E., Evaluating 
Aircraft Abnormal Conditions Using an Artificial Dendritic Cell Mechanism, accepted for 
presentation at International Conference and Exhibition on Mechanical and Aerospace 
Engineering, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Sept. 2014 
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Based Abnormal Condition Accommodation of Aircraft Sub-system Failures, abstract submitted 
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1.1 Literature Review  
 
 Computational Intelligence (CI) methodologies inspired by the biological immune system 
(BIS) emerged in the early nineties as a new approach to address complex real-world problems 
in several fields of study [4]. This bio-inspired approach has led to the development of several 
models such as: genetic algorithms (GA), artificial neural networks (ANN), fuzzy logic 
algorithms and artificial immune systems (AIS). The AIS is a fairly recent paradigm for which 
several models such as Immune Network Models (INM), Danger Theory (DT), Clonal Selection 
Principle (CSP), Negative Selection algorithm (NS) and Dendritic Cell (DC) Algorithms, among 
others, have been developed [11-14]. These AIS mechanisms have shown a promising potential 
in a variety of applications such as pattern recognition [6], computer security [13,14], data 
mining [15,16], adaptive controls [17,18] and anomaly detection [19, 20].  
 The biological immune system is a complex and adaptive system that protects organisms 
from invading pathogens [12]. Historically, the term immunity refers to the condition in which an 
organism can resist or repel infectious diseases [12]. In other words, immunity is the ability of an 
organism to react against foreign or dangerous substances. The immune system has many 
characteristics such as uniqueness, autonomy, distributed detection, noise tolerance, foreigners 
recognition and pattern recognition. These characteristics can be used to distinguish between 
foreign cells (non-self) and the body cells (self) that may damage the organism. Immune systems 
usually work based on two mechanisms: innate and adaptive immunity. Innate immunity is 
directed against general pathogens while the adaptive immunity launches attacks against invader 
cells that the innate system cannot remove.    
18 
  
 The artificial immune system can be defined as a computational paradigm that is inspired 
by theoretical immunology, observed immune functions, principles and mechanisms. The AIS 
uses computational models that mimic the behavior of the biological immune system. The 
fundamental idea of this computational paradigm is that an abnormal condition (i.e. sub-system 
failure) can be declared when a current configuration of features does not match with any other 
configuration of features in nominal conditions. A shown in Figure 1, several techniques have 
been developed to achieve an integrated and effective framework that mimics the BIS [21].     
 
Figure 1- Subdivisions of Computational Intelligence 
Immune Network Model 
 This theory was proposed in the mid-seventies by Jerne. The hypothesis establishes that 
the immune system maintains an idiotypic network of interconnected B-cells for antigen 
recognition. These cells stimulate and suppress each other in a way that allows the network to be 
stable. Two B-cells are connected if the affinities they share exceed a certain threshold, and the 
strength of the connection is directly proportional to the affinity they share [21].   
Computational 
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Danger Theory 
 This theory was primarily developed by Matzinger. The central idea dictates that the 
immune system does not respond to non-self but to danger. Thus, it supports the need for 
discrimination. In other words, instead of responding to foreignness, the immune system reacts to 
danger. Danger is measured by the damage to cells indicated by distress signals that are sent out 
when a cell suffers an unnatural death. The distress signal in this case is not an abstract 
representation of danger but a grounded signal [22].   
Feedback Mechanism 
 This approach is inspired by the feedback mechanism of the immune system. The 
immune system exhibits two types of responses, namely: humoral response and cellular 
response. In the humoral response, antibodies are produced by B-cells to neutralize antigens. In 
the cellular response, killer T-cells capture infected cells to kill them. After foreign materials are 
detected by antigen presenting cells (APC), the APCs transfer information to the helper T-cells. 
The helper T-cells then stimulate B-cells, killer T-cells and suppressor T-cells. The regulation 
between B-cells and killer T-cells is considered the main feedback mechanism of the immune 
system. The suppressor T-cells are an inhibitive mechanism. The helper T-cells and the foreign 
material activate the suppressor T-cells, which inhibit the other cells by creating a tranquilizing 
action in the immune systems. This second feedback is called the inhibitive mechanism. The 
cooperation between these two feedback mechanisms allows the rapid response of the immune 
system to foreign materials and also it quickly stabilize the immune system when needed [18]. 
Clonal Selection 
 The clonal selection principle is the whole process of antigen recognition, cell 
proliferation and differentiation into memory cells [11,12, 21]. This principle describes the basic 
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features of an immune response to an antigenic stimulus. It establishes the idea that only those 
cells that recognize the antigen proliferate, thus being selected against those that do not. Its main 
features are that: 
 The new cells are clones of their parents subjected to a mutation mechanism with high 
rates. 
 Elimination of newly differentiated lymphocytes carrying self-reactive receptors. 
 Proliferation and differentiation on contact of mature cells with antigens. 
Negative Selection 
 This method has inspired most of the existing AIS. The objective of the negative 
selection is to provide tolerance for self cells. It deals with the immune system’s ability to detect 
unknown antigens while not reacting to the self cells. During the maturation of T-cells, if a T-cell 
in the thymus recognizes any self cell, it is eliminated before deploying it for immune 
functionality. The negative selection algorithm generates detectors set by eliminating any 
detector candidate that match elements from a group of self samples [5, 11, 19, 21, 23].  
Dendritic Cells 
 Dendritic cells are responsible for some of the initial pathogenic recognition process, 
sampling the environment and differentiating depending on the concentration signal, or 
perceived misbehavior, in the host tissue cell. They provide a vital link between the innate and 
adaptive immune system. DCs perform the role of coordinating T-cells based immune responses, 
both reactive and for generation tolerance.  The DCs collect antigens from pathogens and host 
cells tissues, and present multiple antigen samples to naive T-cells in the lymph node [22].  
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1.1.1 Artificial Immune System and the Failure Detection and Identification 
Problem 
 
 Damage and failures of aircraft sub-systems is a leading source of aircraft accidents 
throughout the world. Such events, although not very common, have led to a large number of 
fatalities [2, 3]. Incidents such as the DC-10 American Airlines Flight 191 in 1979 (272 
fatalities) [25], B747 Japan Airlines Flight 123 in 1985 (520 fatalities) [24] or the A310 Air 
Transat Flight 961 in 2005 (0 fatalities) [26] have inspired effort toward the development of fault 
tolerant systems [3]. Although not all the examples presented above resulted in catastrophes, it 
should be noted that some of them could have been recovered if a nonstandard set of procedures 
had been used. 
 In recent years, the development of fault-tolerant flight controls emerged as a new 
methodology to increase safety and enhance performance of civilian and military aircraft. Failure 
detection and identification for aircraft over extended areas of the flight envelope presents a 
multi-dimensional and highly complex challenge that needs to be addressed by an integrated 
solution.  Previous approaches to the fault detection and identification problem focused on 
individual classes of failures at isolated and constrained flight conditions [27].  
   In response to the lack of effectiveness of previous methodologies, the AIS emerged as 
a comprehensive and integrated solution to the FDIE problem for aircraft sub-systems, showing 
promising capabilities [7-9, 21]. The application of an integrated high performance AIS-based 
FDIE for a wide variety of aircraft sub-systems failures based on a hierarchical multi-self 
strategy has been proposed and tested by several researchers in the aerospace community. The 
AIS paradigm can address directly the complexity and the multi-dimensionality of aircraft 
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dynamic response to abnormal conditions with a proven record of high detection rates and low 
false alarm rates. The hierarchical multi-self strategy is capable of detecting and identifying 
several categories of abnormal conditions over extended areas of the flight envelope. Its 
effectiveness in terms of false alarms and detection rate has been tested in simulation.   
 The basic idea of AIS-based FDIE is that an abnormal condition can be declared when a 
current configuration of features does not match with any set of known normal conditions 
previously generated through simulation [27-31]. These features can include various sensor 
outputs, state estimates, stability and control derivatives, pilot inputs and derived variables. The 
combination of these features should possess enough information to clearly describe the behavior 
of the system as well as to capture the dynamic signature of abnormal situations. Extensive 
experimental data are necessary to determine the self and the non-self in the hyperspace. 
Computational and storage limitations of the available hardware are a key factor in the 
processing of the data in order to maintain an adequate numerical representation of the self/ non-
self.  
 The processes of detection and identification must be performed in subsequent phases to 
increase the efficiency and reliability of the FDIE solution. Detection is the process of declaring 
that a generic malfunction of the system has occurred, assuming that any or several subsystems 
can be subjected to failure. The subsystems can be actuators, sensors, propulsion, structural 
elements and any other component of the aircraft not limited to hardware (i.e. software, human 
pilot, atmospheric conditions, etc.). The identification process has two or more phases depending 
on the complexity of the subsystems. The first phase of identification consists of determining 
which subsystem has failed. In other words, in which category does the failure fall. The second 
phase of identification determines the failed element (e.g. aileron actuator, pitch sensor or right 
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wing). In some cases, an intermediate step could be defined in order to distinguish among groups 
within the subsystem. For example, if an actuator failure is declared, the intermediate phase of 
identification would determine which of the controls has failed.  
 The aircraft subsystem AIS-based FDIE can be considered to include two main 
processes, namely 1) preprocessing of information and flight data and 2) online detection and 
identification. The preprocessing of data consists of data recording from simulation to the 
generation of detectors for the various phases of the FDIE. It includes activities such as the 
definition of identifiers and detectors, data acquisition, data reduction and detector generation 
and optimization. The online FDIE process includes the development and application of FDIE 
schemes. At this stage, detectors are compared against sets of current values of identifiers 
measured in flight at a certain sampling rate. At each sample, a binary output (i.e., 0 for normal 
or 1 for abnormal) determines if the current values are inside a detector (abnormal condition) or 
outside a detector (normal condition). The FDIE scheme utilizes sets of output values over 
moving time windows, reducing the number of false alarms. Figure 2- illustrates a general 
flowchart of the FDI process.  
 
Figure 2- FDI Algorithm 
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1.1.2 Artificial Neural Networks and the FDI Problem 
 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) emerged in the field of computer science inspired by 
the examination of the central nervous system in the early 1940’s [32]. ANNs are computational 
mathematical models that mimic the behavior of neurons located in the brain. Natural neurons 
receive signals through synapses located on the membranes of the neurons. The neuron is 
activated and emits a signal through the axon. This signal might be sent to another synapse or 
may activate other neurons [33, 34]. Similarly, artificial neurons or “nodes” are non-linear 
functions that act as multiple input-output (MIMO) systems that receive signals, process 
information, produce results and transmit such results to all its outputs. ANNs are data-driven, 
self-adaptive models that can capture subtle functional relationships among noisy data, they can 
capture complex non-linear relationships and primarily, they can automatically adjust themselves 
to optimize their behavior [32, 35, 36]. ANNs have been utilized for system identification, 
clustering, vector quantification, pattern association/recognition, feature detection, optimization 
and control. 
The application of Neural Networks in the aerospace industry has grown vastly in the 
past several years. Its applications evolved from the simplest model validation techniques to 
more advanced adaptive control law algorithms. Some of the areas in which ANNs have been 
used in aerospace applications are [32-36]: 
 Control Systems 
 Stability Augmentation Systems 
 Process Modeling 
 Radar Signal Processing 
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 Sensory Information Processing 
 Computer Vision 
In recent years, researchers and engineers have shown interest in the utilization of ANNs 
for the development of intelligent flight control systems that enhance aircraft control during 
physical failure or aerodynamic changes resulting from failures in modeling errors. Commonly, 
the neural networks are used to generate command augmentation signals to compensate for 
errors caused by un-modeled dynamics. Other applications of ANN in control law design 
consists of augmenting Non-Linear Dynamic Inversion (NLDI) controllers with pre-trained 
neural networks (NLDI+NN), providing the values of the aerodynamic and stability derivatives 
within the whole flight envelope while cancelling the errors introduced by the dynamic inversion 
[32]. 
In addition to this approach, reference control models have been introduced in order to 
filter command inputs in order to obtain desired handling qualities while the NLDI+NN is used 
to determine necessary control surface deflections. The neural network system accommodates 
large errors that are not anticipated in the nominal control law by recognizing patterns in the 
behavior of the error. The on-line learning capability of ANNs also provides additional potential 
for adapting to changes in aircraft dynamics due to damage or failure. 
Previous research efforts have shown that the utilization of variables generated within the 
control laws can be used as parameters for the self/non-self definition for AIS-FDIE purposes [7, 
37]. Also, it has been shown that adaptive control laws with a “model predictor” architecture 
based on a NLDI+NN also possess a great potential for FDIE purposes. Generally, the ANN 
used in this approach operates as a “closed-loop” architecture, thus the aircraft must be equipped 
with such a control system.  
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Furthermore, a new FDIE scheme in which the ANNs are included as part of the data 
processing algorithm has been proposed in order to avoid this limitation. In this configuration the 
ANNs operate in an “open-loop” configuration and are no longer part of the control laws. This 
configuration guarantees the portability of the FDIE scheme to various platforms regardless of 
their control law system.  
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Chapter 2 Immunity-Based Failure Detection  
 
The biological immune system relies on the generation of specialized cells, called 
antibodies (e.g. T-cells), that do not match the chemical marker of cells belonging to the host 
organism [10]. This characteristic allows the antibodies to detect, bind and mark for destruction 
almost any antigen without damaging “self” cells. Aircraft sub-system failures are considered 
abnormal conditions analogous to the antigens present in biological systems. The general idea of 
the Artificial Immune System for Failure Detection, Identification and Evaluation (AIS-FDIE) is 
that an abnormal condition can be declared when a certain configuration of “features” does not 
match any pre-determined configuration of “features” at normal conditions. These “features” 
include several sensor outputs, state estimates, statistical parameters or any other variables that 
contain information about the dynamic fingerprint of the aircraft and are able to capture the 
fingerprint of abnormal conditions. These “features” are analogous to the chemical markers that 
represent the encoding of the self in biological systems.  
In general, the detection problem must be generated in great detail and cautiously. The 
detection logic must be designed for real-time operation with a high rate of failure detection and 
a low number of false alarms. In order to properly identify the features that capture the signature 
of failure conditions and to obtain a successful AIS detection scheme, the algorithm must include 
information about the system’s operational envelope, the targeted sub-systems and the nature and 
type of abnormal conditions expected.  
  For example, let us assume that an aircraft possess four major sub-systems, with their 
components, corresponding to: actuators, sensors, propulsion systems and structural elements. 
Each set of actuators may include two ailerons, one rudder, two throttles and one elevator. The 
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sensors considered may be the angular rate gyros. The propulsion system may consist of two 
engines and, for the structural elements, only the wings might be considered. In this example, the 
total number of sub-systems    results to be              . 
For each sub-system    a list of      abnormal conditions  types must be formulated. For 
example, actuator abnormal conditions may be locked control surfaces or an actuator moving 
freely. For the sensor list, the failures could be constant output and sensor bias. If we assume that 
two types of failures are considered for each sub-system, the total number of failure results 
would be    ∑     
  
      . The definition and analysis of the failure is important for the 
process of selecting and defining the features. The feature variables should completely define the 
targeted systems and achieve the self/non-self discrimination. Table 1 presents an example of 
features, or states, which can be used for the self/non-self definition.  
Table 1- List of Feature for AIS-FDI Design 
  = Altitude  ̇ = Yaw Acceleration 
  = Ground Speed    = Longitudinal Stick Displacement 
  = Mach Number    = Lateral Stick Displacement 
   = Longitudinal Acceleration    = Pedal Displacement 
   = Lateral Acceleration    = Throttle Command 
   = Vertical Acceleration      = Roll Rate Command 
  = Angle of Attack      = Pitch Rate Command 
  = Sideslip Angle      = Yaw Rate Command 
  = Roll Angle     = Roll Rate Estimate 
  = Pitch Angle     = Pitch Rate Estimate 
  = Yaw Angle     = Yaw Rate Estimate 
  = Roll Rate      = Main Quadratic Estimation Error 
  = Pitch Rate      = Output Quadratic Estimation Error 
  = Yaw Rate       = 
Decentralized Quadratic Roll Rate 
Estimation Error 
 ̇ = Roll Acceleration       = 
Decentralized Quadratic Pitch Rate 
Estimation Error 
 ̇ = Pitch Acceleration       = 
Decentralized Quadratic Yaw Rate 
Estimation Error 
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The list includes 32 different features that could be processed to obtain a 32-dimensional 
hyper-space that defines the self/non-self projection. The high dimensionality representation 
presents a significant computational cost that should and can be avoided by means of the 
“Hierarchical Multi-Self (HMS) Strategy”, which reduces the order of the projections into sub-
selves. The HMS strategy relies on the assumption that some features may be relevant in 
capturing some types of failures and may lack relevance with respect to others. Therefore, lower 
dimensional projections of the self/non-self may be enough to detect and identify specific 
failures. It should be noted that lower dimensional projection may reduce the detection 
capabilities under certain circumstances. In this research effort, sets of 2-dimensional and 3-
dimensional projections are investigated. The total number of sub-selves     that can be built for 
a complete set of      features and         feature combinations is: 
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     (1) 
 
Similarly for 3-dimensional projection (      ): 
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It should be noted that, even though 4960 projections are possible, it was decided that it 
would be lengthy and somewhat unnecessary to generate such a large number of projections. 
Therefore, only 45 3-dimensional projections were created. The 3-dimensional projections were 
not included in this effort.  
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2.1 Generation of Detectors 
  
The process of generating detectors, or antibodies, is an exhaustive and lengthy procedure that 
requires adequate computational data processing capabilities and adequate numerical 
representations of the self/non-self. In this research effort, 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional 
selves were generated for the self/non-self representation using the “Cluster Set Union Method” 
(CSUM). In the CSUM, extensive experimental data are necessary to properly determine the 
nominal “hyper-space” representation. For each combination of features corresponding to a 
particular projection segments of data are processed separately to produce sets of detectors that 
cover the non-self hyperspace.   
 
 
Figure 3- Cluster Set Union Based Logic 
 
 
31 
  
2.1.1 Cluster Set Union Method 
 
 The CSUM is a 5 phase process that uses an optimized algorithm to fuse different sets of 
clusters generated from single sets of flight or simulation data. This methodology is particularly 
convenient when the computer characteristics used for pre-processing are not powerful enough 
for an efficient application of the algorithms. The methodology is described next: 
    
1) Preliminary Data Processing: The prerecorded data are split into subsets for memory 
allocation convenience. Then, the individual sets of data are normalized in order to obtain 
values between 0 and 1, leading to a hypercube space for the selected features. The 
normalization factor for each dimension is determined by the span of the flight data plus 
a percentage margin. Alternatively, desired maximum and minimum values can be 
specified in the computation of the normalization factor. It is important to remark that the 
same normalization factors must be used in all data sub sets. 
2) Clustering of Individual Data Sets: The normalized data generated in the previous step 
define self points that need to be represented by a definite number of geometric hyper-
bodies called clusters. The clustering mechanism is based on a modified version of a “k-
means” vector quantization algorithm.  
3) Cluster Set Union: Once several sets of clusters have been generated, a fusion process is 
performed. The fusion process consists of the unions of cluster sets as well as 
overlapping elimination.       
4) Elimination of Duplicate Clusters: The clusters generated in the previous step may 
overlap each other causing an unnecessary use of computing power that can be 
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eliminated. Since the radius of each cluster is known, the overlapping between a current 
cluster and the nearest one(s) can be determined. The distance between centers must be 
greater than or equal to the sum of radii of the overlapping clusters minus the permitted 
overlapping threshold. This approach favors clusters with larger radii and clusters with a 
more efficient coverage. Also, this approach allows the update of the database when new 
flight test data are available by clustering only the newly acquired data sets and adding 
the results to the older sets while eliminating any duplicates.  
 
 
Figure 4- Elimination of Duplicates 
 
5) Generation of Detectors: Self clusters are used to generate detectors by covering the 
non-self hyper-space with hyper-bodies similar to the clusters. An enhanced negative 
selection algorithm for real-valued representation with variable non-self radius (ENSA-
RV) is used in this research effort. This algorithm ensures that there is no overlapping 
with the self and that the non-self is covered to the desired predefined amount. It should 
be noted that the algorithm requires certain parameters that must be selected carefully. 
The detector generation process can be stopped when a desired coverage of the non-self 
is achieved or after a prescribed number of iterations when a preset maximum number of 
detectors is reached. In general, the following optimization criteria may be considered 
when generating detectors: 
33 
  
 No overlapping among self and non-self 
 Minimum empty space in the self clusters 
 Minimum uncovered non-self space 
 Minimum overlapping among self clusters  
 Minimum overlapping among non-self detectors 
 Minimum number of detectors 
 
Figure 5 shows an example of a 2-dimensional projection of the dynamics of an aircraft 
throughout the investigated flight envelope. The variables shown are a reference roll rate 
command and a neural network roll rate estimate for the x and y axes respectively. It should be 
noted that the blue clusters represent the self and the red clusters represent the non-self.   
 
Figure 5- Self/Non-Self Projection 
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2.1.2 Detection Performance Analysis 
 
 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a total amount of 496 2-dimensional projections of 
sub-selves were generated. Also, out of the 4960 possibilities for 3-dimensional sub-selves, only 
45 were generated. Their performance was analyzed and compared based on the detection rate 
(DR) and false alarm (FA) rate. The detection function output is a binary signal that determines 
if a sub-system failure has been detected (output=1) or if the aircraft is flying at nominal 
conditions (output=0). The binary output can be categorized in four types as follows: 
 True Positive (TP): A failure is detected and declared as failure 
 True Negative (TN): Nominal conditions are declared as nominal 
 False Positive (FP): Nominal conditions are declared as failures 
 False Negative (FN): Failure condition is not detected  
These categories can be used for a quantitative evaluation of the DR and FA. The following 
equations can be used to calculate the DR of a specified projection. 
 
   
  
     
     
 
  (3) 
Similarly, the FA rate can be calculates as follows: 
 
   
  
     
     
 
  (4) 
It can be seen that both rates are ratios of the corresponding condition divided by the total 
amount of data points considered to be of that particular condition respectively.   
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2.2 Simulation Environment  
 
The flight test data utilized for the generation of detectors were obtained using a 6DOF 
motion based flight simulator (shown in Figure 6) at West Virginia University (WVU). The 
flight simulator has been interfaced with an external computer on which the research aircraft 
dynamic model can be run within the MATLAB/Simulink environment. The Simulink model 
used for this research effort is customized in such a way that the flight conditions could 
correspond to either nominal or upset conditions. It should be noted that the flight test data were 
also used in the identification and direct evaluation phase of this research effort. Therefore, all 
mentions of flight test data should reference back to this section.  
 
Figure 6- WVU 6-DOF Motion-Based Flight Simulator 
The aircraft model used includes a model following adaptive control based on a non-
linear dynamic inversion and an artificial neural network (ANN) augmentation architecture, 
which also produces estimates of the aircraft angular rates and angular acceleration errors. Figure 
6 shows the top level Simulink model of the aircraft interfaced with the flight simulator. 
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Figure 7- Top level Simulink Model for the WVU Flight Simulator Interface 
 
A broad range of flight test scenarios was performed over a wide range area of the flight 
envelope. The flight envelope is split into nine specific points for Mach number ranging between 
0.6 to 0.9 and altitudes between 9000 ft and 31000 ft. The flight scenarios are simulated under 
nominal flight conditions lasting between 10 and 20 minutes each. These nominal flights include 
steady state flight conditions and transitions from steady state to mild and moderate flight 
maneuver conditions. These flights are then repeated under one failure at a time to capture the 
dynamic fingerprint of each type of failure. Figure 8 presents the nine specific points of the flight 
envelope used for all the flight scenarios. 
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Figure 8- Investigated Flight Envelope 
 
2.3 Detection Results 
 
The detection rates and false alarms were calculated for 26 different failures varying in 
subsystem type and severity using Equations (3) and (2). Table 2 shown below presents a sample 
set of projections among the 496 generated sub-selves that were selected as an example of the 
relevant combination of features utilized in this effort. 
Table 2- Features of Selected Projections 
Self Features Self Features Self Features Self Features 
Self#3          Self#94       Self#85          Self#105        
Self#30          Self#95       Self#86           Self#106       
Self#42        Self#96       Self#87           Self#224         
Self#53         Self#97       Self#89       Self#233          
Self#82         Self#98       Self#90       Self#410      ̇ 
Self#83         Self#99        Self#92      Self#441      ̇ 
Self#84          Self#100        Self#93       Self#471      ̇ 
Table 3 presents the performance analysis of those selves under four different failures: 
left aileron locked at 2.5 deg., left stabilator locked at 2 deg., 6% left wing loss and 5 deg bias in 
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the pitch rate sensor output. A sample set of 20 projections is presented. The detection rate as 
well as the false alarm rate is shown.  
Table 3- Detection Performance 
Self 
Left Aileron Locked at  
2 deg 
Left Stabilator Locked at  
2 deg 
6% Loss of Left Wing Pitch Rate Sensor Bias (5 deg/sec) 
DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA 
S3 82 1 99.3 1.85 99 1.1 2.27 1 
S30 83.5 0.0 99.2 0.0 99.5 0.0 4.16 0.0 
S42 0.0 0.0 8.22 0.0 0.1 0.0 99.9 0.0 
S53 22.9 0.0 24.8 0.0 25.1 0.0 86.7 0.0 
S82 92.3 0.0 99.7 0.0 99.2 0.0 4.63 0.0 
S83 88.1 0.0 99.6 0.0 99 0.0 0.22 0.0 
S84 86.2 0.0 99.5 0.0 99 0.0 0.05 0.0 
S85 88.7 0.0 99.4 0.0 98.9 0.0 26.5 0.0 
S86 84.2 0.0 99.4 0.0 98.9 0.0 24.2 0.0 
S87 80.4 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.1 0.0 46.8 0.0 
S89 90 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.2 0.0 1.46 0.0 
S90 91.1 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 0.68 0.0 
S92 80.8 0.0 99.3 0.0 99 0.0 0.09 0.0 
S93 82.9 1.25 99.4 1.55 99.4 0.0 1.3 0.0 
S94 85.8 2.25 99.5 2.25 99 2.4 0.51 2.25 
S95 90.9 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.1 0.0 0.87 0.0 
S96 89.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.3 0.0 3.18 0.0 
S97 86.3 0.0 99.5 0.0 99 0.0 0.08 0.0 
S98 94.6 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.2 0.0 11.2 0.0 
S99 86 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.2 0.0 2.98 0.0 
S100 86.9 0.0 99 0.0 97.7 0.0 0.16 0.0 
S105 91.1 0.0 99.6 0.0 99 0.0 12.2 0.0 
S106 93.1 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.1 0.0 6.76 0.0 
S224 0.36 0.0 1.85 0.0 0.9 0.0 63.7 0.0 
S233 5.51 0.0 8.04 0.0 12.4 0.0 87.8 0.0 
S410 81.4 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.1 0.0 0.06 0.0 
S441 80.9 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.1 0.0 0.64 0.0 
S471 80.5 0.0 99.3 0.0 98.9 0.0 0.05 0.0 
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The results from Table 3 show that certain selves favor the detection of certain types of 
failures while showing poor detection rates for others. This fact has been used in previous 
research efforts. The presented mechanism uses low order projections to build sub-selves using a 
specific hierarchy of features relevance with respect to each type of failure. Figures 9-12 show 
the individual detection rate obtained for different projections and four different failures.   
 
 
Figure 9- Detection Rate of Left Aileron Locked at 2.5 deg Failure 
 
 
Figure 10- Detection Rate of Left Stabilator Locked at 2 deg Failure 
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Figure 11- Detection Rate of 6% Left Wing Loss Failure 
 
 
Figure 12- Detection Rate of Pitch Sensor Bias of 5 deg/sec Failure 
 
Figure 12 presents the detection rate that a single projection can attain when tested against four 
different failures. It should be noted how a single projection is able to detect three different 
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failures successfully while showing poor performance for a sensor failure. This is due to the fact 
that the dynamics of such failure do not have great impact on the features corresponding to Self 
87. 
 
 
Figure 13- Detection Rate of Self 87 for 4 Types of Failure 
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Chapter 3 Immunity-Based Failure Identification  
  
The identification phase is the second step in the aircraft health assessment algorithm. 
The identification phase consists of the correct classification of the sub-system, type and severity 
of the failure the aircraft is suffering at any particular time during flight. The identification 
algorithm is only activated when the detection algorithm declares that an abnormal condition is 
present. The identification phase assumes that the output of the detection phase is correct.  
   In this research effort a novel structured non-self approach (SNSA) has been developed 
within a HMS strategy [38]. This approach is based on a structuring process, or arrangement, of 
non-self projections and intends to reduce the computational effort required and facilitate the 
real-time application of the AIS approach without compromising the FDIE performance. The 
SNSA consists of a dual- phase algorithm where 2-dimensional self/non-self projections, 
previously generated using a negative selection mechanism and tested in simulation under 
several abnormal conditions, are selected according to the ability to detect failures at a 
predefined detection rate (DR) percentage. Then, by using a positive selection-type mechanism, 
the resulting projections are processed in order to generate identifiers capable of differentiating 
similar dynamic prints among several abnormal conditions and declaring correct failure types, 
and magnitudes.   
  For example, within a first phase of the SNSA, a total of 496 self/non-self projections 
were generated based on the availability of 32 features to capture the dynamic print of abnormal 
conditions. After extensive experimentation it was possible to reduce the number of self/non-self 
projections to 183 possible candidates with a DR equal or larger than 70%. These projections are 
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considered to possess the ability to capture the dynamic print of several sub-system failures and, 
more importantly, facilitate the process of characterizing the projections that perform better 
during the identification of specific failures. Table 4 presents a sample set of 2-dimensional 
projections investigated within the identification phase. 
Table 4- Self/Non-Self Projections 
Self Features Self Features 
Self#3          Self#56          
Self#4          Self#57          
Self#7           Self#60           
Self#8            Self#61            
Self#9            Self#62            
Self#30          Self#69        
Self#31          Self#82         
Self#34          Self#83         
Self#35            Self#84          
Self#36            Self#85          
Self#42          Self#86           
Self#52         Self#87           
Self#53         Self#88           
 It is important to note that the dynamic fingerprint of several failures may produce a very 
similar effect on the features of self/non-self projections. This characteristic presents a more 
complex problem in which incorrect identification may be produced if the identification problem 
is not defined appropriately. For example, let us assume that an identification algorithm, only 
consisting of Self#3 (         ), is tested for two sub-system failures (i.e. right wing structural 
failure and left aileron stuck failure). This particular pair of failures will produce an undesired 
roll rate that can be successfully perceived and detected by Self#3. The dynamic fingerprint 
produced by both abnormal conditions in the selected projection may look very similar, 
increasing the complexity of the identification problem. Now, let us assume that the same 
identification algorithm is augmented with Self#30 (        ), which can also capture the 
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abnormal condition dynamic print of the mentioned failures. Due to the fact that Self#30 also 
captures dynamic changes in pitch rate, it is possible to identify and distinguish between the two 
mentioned failures. Within a second phase of the SNSA, positive selection applied to the 183 
self/non-self projections is performed in order to address the mentioned identification problem. 
Figures 14a, 14b and 15a, 15b shown below present the similarity of the dynamic print of two 
different failures in a 2-dimensional projection.  
The combined identification capabilities of the projections utilized within the two phases of 
the SNSA (see Figure 16) provides a more robust system capable of not only correctly 
identifying the detected failure but also providing information regarding the magnitude of the 
investigated failures. With the correct combination of projections and their corresponding 
identifiers, it is possible to discard incorrect failures and ultimately determine which abnormal 
condition is affecting the system.  
 
 
a)                                                           b) 
Figure 14- a) Self#3 with Left Aileron Failure, b) Self#3 with Right Wing Structural Damage 
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a)                                                                                 b) 
Figure 15- a) Self#30 with Left Aileron Failure, b) Self#30 with Right Wing Structural Damage 
  
 
 
Figure 16- Structured Non-Self Approach Logic 
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3.1 Generation of Identifiers  
 
  The process to generate identifiers is very similar to the detector generation algorithm. 
The generation of identifiers is based on a positive selection algorithm in which failure flight test 
data are reproduced in order to record the dynamic fingerprint of a failure throughout the entire 
flight envelope. The generation of identifiers consists of a multi-step process that optimizes the 
generation and where the radii of the identifiers depend mostly on their distance to the self rather 
than a greater coverage of the non-self. Figure 17 presents the generation logic for the generation 
of identifiers. 
 
 
Figure 17- Identifier Generation Logic 
 
Abnormal Flight Tests: Several flight tests at different abnormal conditions throughout the 
entire flight envelope were performed. Previously selected features corresponding to the 
self/non-self definition as shown in Table 1 are recorded for future processing and identifier 
definition. Section IV provides more details on the flight testing environment and conditions. 
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Normalization: The sets of raw data received from the flight tests are recorded so that their 
values are normalized between 0 and 1. The normalization factor of each projection is 
determined by the range of the flight data plus a percent margin. The normalization factor is the 
same used for the self/non-self projections during the antibodies generation. Therefore, the 
normalized data points of failure data correspond to the correct hypercube projection of each 
specific feature combination. 
Offset Hypercubes: The unit hypercube determined during the normalization process delimits 
the hyperspace of the nominal condition flight tests. High magnitude failures may contain data 
points that lay far away from the unit hypercube of the self/non-self projection. Therefore, 
outward concentric hypercubes are defined in order to determine the distance of the abnormal 
condition point from the self, which subsequently allows the algorithm to determine the 
magnitude of the corresponding failure.  
 
 
Figure 18- Radii Variation With Respect to Distance from the Self 
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Radii Assignment: The radius of any identifier is predetermined and it is assigned depending on 
the location of its center with respect to the offset hypercubes. The radius of an identifier 
increases as the position of its center lies within an outward hybercube. In other words, the radii 
of all identifiers increase as their distance to the self increases. Figure 17 shows an example of 
the offset hypercube and the radii assignment.  
Identifiers Elimination/Fusion: The amount of initial identifiers depends on the number of data 
points obtained from the flight tests. This yields to an enormous number of identifiers which will 
produce a degradation of the computer processing capability. A simple elimination algorithm is 
implemented in order to reduce the number of identifiers. Identifiers that lay inside the radius of 
another identifier plus a tolerance are eliminated. Finally, a fusion process is performed. The 
fusion process consists of a set union accompanied with overlapping elimination. After this step 
is concluded, the final number of identifiers is reduced considerably.   
 
3.2 Structured Non-Self Phase I: Non-Self 2D-Projections Selection 
 
  The first phase of the SNSA is the result of the failure detection testing within the HMS 
strategy. As mentioned previously, 496 2-dimensional self/non-self projections were generated 
for failure detection algorithm experimentation. These projections were then tested against over 
20 different failures including several sub-systems under different failure magnitudes. Extensive 
experimentation was required in order to determine which projections could substantially detect 
a failure with good detection rates and minimum false alarms within a negative selection 
approach. It was determined that a total of 183 projections were able to fulfill the objectives of a 
DR equal or higher than 70%. This process is referred to as the Phase I Non-Self Structure. The 
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selected projections were chosen as potential candidates for identification included sensor 
outputs, state estimates and statistical parameters among other features. The set of abnormal 
conditions involved sensor failures, structural damage on the wings, engine failures and control 
surface failures. Table 5 shown below presents a list of the failures investigated in this research 
effort. 
Table 5- Investigated Sub-System Failures 
Failure # Failure Type Failure # Failure Type 
1 Left Aileron 2deg 9 Left Wing Loss 6% 
2 Right Aileron 2deg 10 Right Wing Loss 6% 
3 Left Aileron 8deg 11 Left Wing Loss 15% 
4 Right Aileron 8deg 12 Right Wing Loss 15% 
5 Left Stabilator 2deg 13 Left Engine Out 
6 Right Stabilator 2deg 14 Right Engine Out 
7 Left Stabilator 8deg 15 Roll Sensor Bias 5deg/sec 
8 Right Stabilator 8deg 16 Roll Sensor Bias 10deg/sec 
 
 Several failures presented similar dynamic prints on several 2D-projections, which 
subsequently led to the repetition of several projections with the ability to detect multiple 
failures. On the other hand, certain failures that are difficult to detect, such as rudder failure, only 
resulted in the activation of a small number of projections. The negative selection logic behind 
the Phase I Structure resulted in the reduction of the number of the original projections into a 
smaller set, reducing the complexity and the hardware requirements for its implementation. 
Table 6 presents a sample of the projections that are considered to be adequate for abnormal 
condition identification based on a detection performance equal or higher than 70%. 
 Table 6 presents the detection capability of a sample set of projections for five types of 
failures. This analysis was performed on the 496 original projections under 26 failures varying in 
sub-system categories, failures types and magnitudes. Various projections present the ability to 
capture the dynamic fingerprint of several abnormal conditions while others can only capture the 
50 
  
dynamics of a small set or just a single abnormal condition. For example, Self#3 demonstrated its 
ability to capture the dynamic fingerprint of a left aileron locked, a right wing structural damage 
and a left stabilator locked failure. On the other hand, Self#4 only demonstrated the ability to 
capture the dynamic fingerprint of a left stabilator locked type of failure.   
 
Table 6- Detection Performance of a Sample Set of Projections 
             Failure 
 
Self 
Left Aileron 
stuck at 2.5 
deg 
Right Wing 6% 
Structural 
Damage 
Left 
Stabilator 
Stuck at 8 deg. 
Right Engine 
Out 
Pitch 
Sensor 
10deg/sec 
Bias 
Self# 3 82.02 99.84 99.96 10.51 3.42 
Self# 4 1.45 3.87 99.85 1.42 4.08 
Self# 30 83.49 99.83 99.96 10.57 30.02 
Self# 31 0.85 1.94 99.82 0.52 60.68 
Self# 52 0.99 0.76 1.56 1.10 71.52 
Self# 56 86.85 99.94 99.88 12.94 0.59 
Self# 82 92.33 99.96 99.97 21.32 15.01 
Self# 83 88.06 99.93 99.97 14.13 0.74 
Self# 84 86.23 99.94 99.98 12.05 0.30 
Self# 85 88.76 99.91 99.96 12.80 37.42 
Self# 100 86.92 99.45 99.25 15.20 0.46 
Self# 142 0.06 29.35 56.08 72.42 0.99 
Self# 233 5.51 7.47 7.02 5.49 92.07 
Self# 259 13.44 54.05 77.33 72.54 9.41 
Self# 350 15.39 33.10 60.70 72.47 22.27 
Self# 351 26.07 50.30 67.13 71.49 14.23 
Self# 433 1.39 1.44 6.76 2.33 77.7 
 
  Within this analysis it was possible to isolate the projections that can be used for 
identification purposes. From the Phase I Non-self structure analysis, it was possible to 
determine which specific projections correspond to every specific failure investigated. 
Furthermore, it is also possible to determine how many projections capture the dynamic 
fingerprint of an abnormal condition. Table 7 below presents the number of projections from the 
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183 total selected that have the potential ability to be used as a projection for identification 
purposes.  
Table 7- Total Number of Projections Activated per Failure 
Actuator Engine Structural 
Aileron Stuck (8deg) Stabilator Stuck (8deg) Rudder Stuck (8deg) Engine Out Wing Damage (15%) 
Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right 
31 31 72 62 9 11 31 4 31 31 
 
 The outcome of the Phase I Non-Self structure reduces the total amount of projections 
needed to perform the FDIE algorithm. Alternately, its outcome allows the adequate design of 
the mapped-based positive selection algorithm utilized in the second phase of the SNSA by 
reducing the number of possible projections for the generation of identifiers as well as the 
reduction of identifiers required in the identification algorithm for each individual projection.        
 
3.3 Structured Non-Self Phase II: Positive Selection Algorithm 
 
 Phase II of SNSA includes a positive selection process where flight failure test data are 
used to generate higher resolution non-self detectors called identifiers. Resulting projections 
from Phase I are processed in order to generate identifiers capable of differentiating similar 
dynamic prints among several abnormal conditions and declaring correct failure types, and 
magnitudes. In order to obtain correct identification results, the identification logic must be 
carefully formulated and the generation and selection of identifiers must be adequate. Sub-sets of 
antibodies or identifiers must be generated with sufficient resolution to avoid incorrect outputs.   
The identifiers generated during Phase I and II are then loaded into an identification 
function and organized in a single array such that the index of each identifier corresponds to a 
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failure type and magnitude. The arrangement of the identifiers is inspired by a mapping-based 
algorithm, which simplifies the selection scheme. The positive selection process is performed in 
parallel by all the projections included in the identification algorithm. Each projection outputs a 
single index that corresponds to a type and magnitude of failure. The outputs of all projections 
are compared among each other and the most frequent value is determined. If a specific failure 
index is constant throughout the majority of the projections’ outputs, its value is selected and a 
proper identification is declared.  
  The approach investigated in this paper covers not only a general identification logic, but 
also a qualitative and quantitative evaluation logic integrated into a single less complex 
algorithm. This novel approach intends to reduce the computational processing for real time 
application of the solution to the FDIE problem. The proposed mapping-based positive selection 
logic targets a multi-dimensional problem by means of a simpler but effective logic that can 
result in a more efficient real time algorithm. 
3.3.1 Direct Evaluation  
 
 In previous efforts, the FDIE algorithm consisted in a step-by-step process in which a 
failure was first detected. The following step was the identification of the subsystem under 
failure followed by the qualitative evaluation that determines the type of failure. Then the 
severity of the failure was estimated through a process called quantitative evaluation. The 
qualitative and quantitative evaluation steps are known as “Direct Evaluation”. Finally, the 
estimation of the flight envelope reduction, or Indirect Evaluation, is performed.  
The evaluation process suggested in previous efforts was a three-step process in the FDIE 
algorithm. In this work, the determination of the type and severity of a failure, also known as 
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direct evaluation, is incorporated in the identification stage as a single process, leaving the 
indirect evaluation as an individual stage in the SNSA algorithm proposed.  
 The identification process mentioned in section 3.3 is capable of declaring the subsystem 
under failure, the type of failure and the magnitude. Figure 19 demonstrates the novel 
architecture used in this effort.  
 
 
Figure 19- Integration of Direct Evaluation and SNS Identification 
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3.4 Identification Results 
 
   The identification phase performance was evaluated similarly to the detection 
performance in which a correct identification percentage and a miss-identification percentage are 
calculated depending on an accurate declaration of subsystem failure for every time step in 
which an upset condition is present.  The identifier generation algorithm proposed in this 
research effort was implemented for 9 different failures considered to be high magnitude using 
the 183 selected projections. Based on the assumption that lower magnitude failures of the same 
type of failure generate similar dynamic fingerprints with a close proximity to the self, the set of 
identifiers was subdivided into two groups. The first set corresponds to high magnitude and the 
second set to low magnitude failures (i.e. closer to the Self). This approach increases the total 
amount of failures that can be identified to 18 instead of the original 9.  A total of 1647 different 
cases for identifier generation were implemented in order to cover all the possible failure outputs 
investigated. 
   Each set of identifiers generated per failure contains on average 36 identifiers. 
Considering that every set of identifiers for all failures is integrated into each projection, an 
approximate total of 324 identifiers per projection are used for the identification positive 
selection process.  
   After an initial analysis, the algorithm was optimized and it was determined that out of 
the 183 projections, a total of 93 projections were enough to correctly identify the investigated 
failures. The reduction of the total number of projections required for identification has reduced 
the computational complexity of the algorithm considerably. Table 8 presents a sample set of 
projections used for failure identification. 
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Table 8- Projections Used for Identification 
Self# Features Self# Features Self# Features Self# Features 
3          57          110           121       
4          60           111           123        
7           82         113       124        
9            83         114       125        
31          84          115       126        
34           86           116       127        
35            87           117       128        
42        88           118       129        
56          107         120       130       
 
  Further analysis was carried out to reduce the number of projections required to produce 
desirable identification outputs. In some cases, the use of a single projection was enough to 
obtain favorable identification rates. On the other hand, other failures require more projections in 
order to obtain desirable identification results and also to redeuce misidentification rates. Table 9 
shown below present the number of projections required for a correct failure identification 
output. 
 
Table 9 Total Number of Projections Used for Identification 
Failure 
# 
Failure Type 
Projections 
Used 
Failure 
# 
Failure Type 
Projections 
Used 
1 Left Aileron Stuck at 2deg 14 9 Left Wing Loss of 6% 2 
2 Right Aileron Stuck at 2deg 7 10 Right Wing Loss of 6% 1 
3 Left Aileron Stuck at 8deg 8 11 Left Wing Loss of 15% 1 
4 Right Aileron Stuck at 8deg 8 12 Right Wing Loss of 15% 2 
5 Left Stabilator Stuck at 2deg 18 13 Left Engine Out 1 
6 Right Stabilator Stuck at 2deg 2 14 Right Engine Out 18 
7 Left Stabilator Stuck at 8deg 9 15 Roll Sensor Bias of 5deg/sec 1 
8 Right Stabilator Stuck at 8deg 31 16 Roll Sensor Bias of 10deg/sec 7 
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  The identification algorithm was tested under 16 different failures (refer to Table 9). Table 
10 shown below presents the results for identification rate analysis. The table below includes the 
false identification percent for other types of failures. It should be noted that in some cases the 
dynamic fingerprint of a failure fell outside an identifier. For these particular cases, the 
identification algorithm output a 0% identification rate. For simplicity, a “no identified failure” 
column was not included in Table 10. It should be noted that Table 10 presents the identification 
results in a horizontal fashion. For example, failure #1 is output correctly 99.7% of the time but 
presents confusion with failures 3, 4 and 14 for 0.1% of the time respectively. 
 
Table 10- Identification Results for 16 Different Failures. 
 
 
Identified Failure # 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Id
en
ti
fi
ed
 F
a
il
u
re
 #
 
1 99.7 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 
2 9.9 87.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.8 0 0 
3 0.4 0 95.6 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 0 
4 0 0 0.1 97.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 2.4 0 0 
5 0.5 1.7 1.5 0 92.5 1.5 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 0 
6 9.9 0 1.2 0 0 86.8 0 2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0.2 1 0 0 0 0 96.1 1.5 0 0 0 1.2 0 0 0 0 
8 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 4.8 93.8 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1.2 2 0.2 0 0 0.1 0 0.9 95.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 2.1 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 94.5 0 0 0 1.1 0 1.2 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 7.6 0.1 92.2 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 1.1 0 97.5 0.3 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 92.6 7.4 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 99.9 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 0 2.1 1.3 95.6 0 
16 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.7 0 0 2.1 0 94.9 
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Chapter 4 Flight Envelope Reduction  
 
The indirect evaluation of a failure, or flight envelope estimation, is a re-assessment of 
the maneuverability, performance, handling qualities and flight envelope (MPHF) limits of an 
aircraft under upset conditions. Evidently, after an aircraft has suffered a failure of any kind the 
MPHF limits are affected and probably impaired significantly. It is of great importance that an 
estimation of the post-failure capabilities of the aircraft is calculated in order to avoid actions 
that may jeopardize the safety of the system and/or the mission. In other words, the achievable 
operational limits are calculated based on all or some dynamic parameters necessary for the 
completion of a task or mission.   
The indirect evaluation process assumes that the failure detection, identification and 
direct evaluation stages are successfully completed.  The post-failure flight envelope reduction 
estimation is performed offline in order to train the system and to generate a database that can be 
loaded into a flight computer. The online application of this methodology will only require 
interpolation between values of the database of failures of the same nature that are not 
contemplated in the investigation. This reduces the computational requirements for this process, 
resulting into a more efficient and simpler algorithm. 
The re-assessment of the MPHFs is an analytical process that requires that the effects of a 
failure are related to at least one feature of the variables set. The features used to generate the 2-
dimensional projections capture the limits of the states related to the dynamics of the aircraft at 
nominal conditions. Therefore, a set of variables that relate to the dynamics of the abnormal 
condition, the aircraft controls and its flight envelope variables must be formulated. These 
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variables are divided into three categories, namely, directly involved variables (DIV), equivalent 
directly involved variables (EDIV) and envelope relevant variables (ERV). 
The DIVs are variables that are directly and significantly affected by an abnormal 
condition. The DIV’s used in this investigation are control surface deflections, measured sensor 
outputs, lift coefficients, side force coefficients and moment coefficients. These variables are 
used to define the upset conditions and they may or may not be part of the features set. Table 11 
presents a list of DIVs used in this analysis.  
Table 11- Directly Involved Variables 
Stabilator Deflection    
Aileron Deflection    
Rudder Deflection    
Throttle Valve Position    
Measured Roll Rate       
Measured Pitch Rate       
Measured Yaw Rate       
Lift Coefficient    
Pitch Moment Coefficient    
Engine Thrust   
 
 If the variables used to define the upset conditions are not part of the set of variables a 
relationship between the DIVs and some other variables in the feature set (EDIVs) must be 
established. The EDIVs are variables that are in fact in the features set and possess a direct 
relation to the abnormal conditions investigated. Table 12 presents a list of EDIVs used for this 
analysis. 
Table 12- Equivalent Directly Involved Variables 
Longitudinal Stick     
Lateral Stick      
Pedals      
Throttle Command      
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 It is clear that the relation between DIVs and EDIVs corresponds to the pilot controller 
commands as a function of control surface actuation, throttle valve position and measured 
angular rates depending on the failure investigated. This relation is demonstrated below such 
that: 
      (   ) 
In which   can be a model reference first order transfer function, a model reference 
second order transfer function or even a linear function.   
Finally, the ERVs are variables in the feature set that contain information about the 
dynamics of the aircraft along the entire flight envelope. These variables can be linear 
accelerations, angular velocities, angular accelerations, Euler angles, altitude, velocity etc. Table 
13 presents a list of relevant envelope variables used for the flight envelope reduction analysis.  
 
Table 13- Envelope Relevant Variables 
Altitude    Vertical Acceleration     
Mach Number   Pitch Acceleration   ̇ 
Velocity    Roll Acceleration   ̇ 
Pitch Rate    Yaw Acceleration   ̇ 
Roll Rate    Angle of Attack    
Yaw Rate    Sideslip Angle    
Longitudinal Acceleration     Pith Angle    
Lateral Acceleration     Bank Angle    
 
The indirect evaluation process requires specific customization depending on the 
subsystem, type of failure and affected parameters of the flight envelope. The strategy relies on 
analytical methods that can be validated to graphical means using the 2-dimensional projections. 
A general framework can be formulated and applied for all the investigated failures. 
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4.1 Quantitative Indirect Evaluation Methodology  
 
The analysis of the flight envelope reduction estimation used in this research effort 
consists of the analytical calculation of the effective control commands after a failure is present 
in the system, and then the estimated ranges for ERV’s are determined graphically through the 2-
dimensional projections that are related to the failure’s dynamics. In other words, the effective 
control stick is calculated based on predefined equations. Then, the 2-dimensional projections 
involving the control stick affected and any other envelope relevant variable is plotted. Next, the 
new values for stick commands are located in the nominal projections. Finally, based on the 
current maximums and minimums of the control stick values, the maximums and minimums of 
the ERVs are found. Figure 20 below illustrates the graphical analysis of the flight envelope 
reduction.  
 
Figure 20- Indirect Evaluation Methodology 
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As mentioned before, the methodology must be tailored depending on the affected 
subsystem and the type of failure. In this research effort, 16 different failures varying in severity 
and type were analyzed for detection and identification. The analytical methods for the control 
stick reduction can be reduced to 9 different failures corresponding to 9 different subsystems. 
This is possible because the variation on severity and/or the changes between left and right 
subsystems does not change the logic behind the indirect evaluation concept. The subsystems 
investigated for the indirect evaluation analysis are stabilators, ailerons, rudders, throttle 
efficiency, angular rate sensors, structural damage to a wing and engine failures.   
 
4.1.1 Locked Stabilator  
 A locked stabilator failure flight envelope reduction can be analyzed through the 
following process. It is important to note that the differentiation between left or right control 
surface failure is negligible. The flight envelope reduction analysis requires the following 
variables: 
        
         
                       ̇      
The relationship between DIV and EDIV can be calculated by a linear function such that: 
     (  )  
   
           
       
 
 
 
(5) 
In which the suffixes     and     denote the left or right control surface and    is a proportional 
value.  
The nominal ranges for the EDIV are calculated as follows: 
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(6) 
         
             
 
 (7) 
 
where typically             . 
  After a failure is present in the system the new ranges for the EDIVs can be calculated as 
follows: 
          
           
 
 
 
(8) 
          
           
 
 (9) 
 
where the value      is the failure magnitude (the position in which the control surface is locked) 
determined by the direct quantitative evaluation process. It is important to note that the same 
concept can be applied to a right stabilator lock with no further modifications to the analysis. 
The calculated ranges of the EDIV are considered to be virtual ranges since the actual 
control stick in the cockpit is still capable of moving freely as in nominal conditions. However, 
the difference is that the effectiveness of the control stick is impaired. The new calculated ranges 
of the EDIV are then used to determine the new ranges for all pertinent ERVs. 
It should be considered that a stabilator failure may have an effect on the ability to 
produce rolling rates. The asymmetry induced by a stabilator failure may produce undesired roll 
moments that must be compensated by an aileron deflection. This required deflection reduces the 
control authority of the roll channel and thus the production of roll rates. This indirect effect 
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must be then calculated in order to determine the influence on the roll command channel and 
subsequently the corresponding aileron deflection.     
The deflection necessary to compensate for the rolling effect produced by a locked 
stabilator failure is considered a pseudo-failure and can be approximated using the balance of 
rolling moments as follows:  
                     (10) 
   
 
      
     
    
     
 
(11) 
in which      is the non-zero trim aileron deflection necessary to compensate the investigated 
failure. 
If we assume a generic aileron deflection convention to be the following: 
    
       
 
 (12) 
 
and the relationship with its corresponding EDIV: 
         (13) 
the nominal lateral control ranges are: 
               (14) 
   
               (15) 
Under stab failure, this becomes: 
          (          ) (16) 
   
          (          ) (17) 
and finally: 
 
         (      
     
    
    ) 
 
(18) 
          (      
     
    
    ) (19) 
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It is important to note that the same concept can be applied to a right stabilator lock with 
no further modifications to the analysis. Also, the aileron pseudo-failure range is the same if the 
opposite stabilator is locked in the opposite direction. 
 
4.1.2 Locked Aileron  
A locked aileron failure flight envelope reduction can be analyzed through the following 
process. It is important to note that the differentiation between a left or right control surface 
failure is negligible. The flight envelope reduction analysis requires the following variables: 
        
         
               ̇  ̇      
The relationship between DIV and EDIV can be calculated by a linear function such that: 
     (  )  
   
           
       
 
 
 
(20) 
in which the suffixes     and     denote the left or right control surface and    is a proportional 
value.  
The nominal ranges for the EDIV are calculated as follows: 
         
             
 
 (21) 
   
         
             
 
 (22) 
 
where typically             . 
After a failure is present in the system the new ranges for the EDIV can be calculated as follows: 
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(23) 
          
           
 
 (24) 
 
where the value      is the failure magnitude (the position in which the control surface is 
locked) determined by the direct quantitative evaluation process. It is important to note that the 
same concept can be applied to a right aileron lock with no further modifications to the analysis.  
The calculated ranges of the EDIV are considered to be virtual ranges since the actual 
control stick in the cockpit is still capable of moving freely as in nominal conditions. However, 
the difference is that the effectiveness of the control stick is impaired. The new calculated ranges 
of the EDIV are then used to determine the new ranges for all pertinent ERVs. 
 
4.1.3 Locked rudder  
A locked rudder failure flight envelope reduction can be analyzed through the following 
process. It is important to note that the differentiation between the left or right control surface is 
negligible. The flight envelope reduction analysis requires the following variables: 
        
         
               ̇  ̇      
The relationship between DIV and EDIV can be calculated by a linear function such that: 
     (  )  
   
           
       
 
 
 
(25) 
66 
  
in which the suffixes     and     denote the left or right control surface and    is a proportional 
value.  
The nominal ranges for the EDIV are calculated as follows: 
         
             
 
 (26) 
   
         
             
 
 (27) 
where typically             . 
After a failure is present in the system the new ranges for the EDIV can be calculated as follows: 
          
           
 
 
 
(28) 
          
           
 
 (29) 
 
where the value      is the failure magnitude (The position in which the control surface is 
locked) determined by the direct quantitative evaluation process. It is important to note that the 
same concept can be applied to a right rudder lock with no further modifications to the analysis.  
The calculated ranges of the EDIV are considered to be virtual ranges since the actual 
control stick in the cockpit is still capable of moving freely as in nominal conditions. However, 
the difference is that the effectiveness of the control stick is impaired. The new calculated ranges 
of the EDIV are then used to determine the new ranges for all pertinent ERVs. 
 
4.1.4 Locked Throttle  
A locked throttle valve failure flight envelope reduction can be analyzed through the 
following process. It is important to note that the differentiation between left or right throttle 
valves is negligible. The flight envelope reduction analysis requires the following variables: 
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The relationship between DIV and EDIV can be calculated by a linear function such that: 
     (   )  
   
 
 
 
           
       
 
 
 
(30) 
In which the suffixes     and     denote the left or right throttle valve and    is a proportional 
value.  
The nominal ranges for the EDIV are calculated as follows: 
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where typically             
After a failure is present in the system the new ranges for the EDIV can be calculated as follows: 
          
           
 
   
        
 
 
 
(33) 
          
           
 
   
    
 
 (34) 
 
where the value      is the failure magnitude (the position in which the throttle valve is locked) 
determined by the direct quantitative evaluation process. It is important to note that the same 
concept can be applied to a right throttle valve failure with no further modifications to the 
analysis.  
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The calculated ranges of the EDIV are considered to be virtual ranges since the actual 
throttle stick in the cockpit is still capable of moving freely as in nominal conditions. However, 
the difference is that the effectiveness of the throttle stick is impaired. The new calculated ranges 
of the EDIV are then used to determine the new ranges for all pertinent ERVs. 
It should be considered that a throttle actuator failure may have an effect on the capability 
to produce yawing rates. The asymmetry induced by a throttle failure may produce undesired 
yaw moments that must be compensated by a rudder deflection. This required deflection reduces 
the control authority of the yaw channel and thus the production of yaw rates. This indirect effect 
must then be calculated in order to determine the influence on the yaw command channel and 
subsequently the corresponding rudder deflection.     
The deflection necessary to compensate for the yawing effect produced by a locked 
throttle failure is considered a pseudo-failure and can be approximated using the balance of 
yawing moments as follows:  
                     (35) 
   
 
      
     
    
     
 
(36) 
in which      is the non-zero trim rudder deflection necessary to compensate the investigated 
failure. 
If we assume a generic rudder deflection convention to be the following:. 
    
       
 
 (37) 
   
and the relationship with its corresponding EDIV: 
         (38) 
   
the nominal lateral control ranges are: 
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               (39) 
   
               (40) 
Under throttle failure, this becomes: 
          (          ) (41) 
   
          (          ) (42) 
and finally: 
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(43) 
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It is important to note that the same concept can be applied to a right throttle lock with no further 
modifications to the analysis. Also, the rudder pseudo-failure range is the same but different 
direction if the opposite throttle valve is locked. 
 
4.1.5 Roll Sensor Bias 
A roll sensor bias failure flight envelope reduction can be analyzed through the following 
process. The process relies on the specifics of the control system that uses the sensor 
information. The control laws of the aircraft determine a “desired” angular rate response 
determined by a reference model designed to satisfy handling qualities criteria. The flight 
envelope reduction analysis requires the following variables: 
           
         
               ̇  ̇      
The relationship between DIV and EDIV can be calculated such that: 
        (  ) (45) 
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in which   represents a first order transfer function obtained from the roll channel reference 
model. It is possible to avoid the use of a transfer function, if it is not available, by finding a 
linear relation between the DIV and the EDIV.   
As a result of the roll sensor failure, an undesired roll rate command is produced in order 
to compensate for the “fake” roll seen by the controller. In other words, the aircraft will rotate in 
the opposite direction of the sensor bias. This behavior must be compensated using an aileron 
command, reducing the authority of the roll channel.  The excursion of the lateral stick control 
necessary to compensate for the control law roll command is equivalent to a bias in the form: 
       
  (     ) (46) 
   
in which    is the necessary excursion of the lateral stick command in order to counteract the 
induced roll rate bias. It is important to note that the transfer function can be substituted by a 
linear relation between the DIV and the EDIV. 
Assuming a linear relation between the stick input    and the control surface actuation   , the 
nominal ranges for the EDIV when a positive roll (       ) rate bias affects the system are 
calculated as follows: 
                  (47) 
   
              (48) 
 
Similarly, for a negative roll rate bias (       ): 
              (49) 
   
                  (50) 
 
With the new ranges of effective lateral stick commands, it is possible to calculate the 
corresponding ranges for all the ERVs using the 2-dimensional projections.  
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4.1.6 Pitch Sensor Bias 
A pitch sensor bias failure flight envelope reduction can be analyzed through the 
following process. The process relies on the specifics of the control system that uses the sensor 
information. The control laws of the aircraft determine a “desired” angular rate response 
determined by a reference model designed to satisfy handling qualities criteria. The flight 
envelope reduction analysis requires the following variables: 
           
         
                     ̇      
The relationship between DIV and EDIV can be calculated such that: 
        (  ) (51) 
   
in which   represents a second order transfer function obtained from the pitch channel reference 
model. It is possible to avoid the use of a transfer function, if it is not available, by finding a 
linear relation between the DIV and the EDIV.   
As a result of the pitch sensor failure, an undesired pitch rate command is produced in 
order to compensate for the “fake” pitch seen by the controller. In other words, the aircraft will 
rotate in the opposite direction of the sensor bias. This behavior must be compensated using a 
stabilator/elevator command, reducing the authority of the pitch channel.  The excursion of the 
longitudinal stick control necessary to compensate for the control law pitch command is 
equivalent to a bias in the form: 
       
  (     ) (52) 
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in which     is the necessary excursion of the longitudinal stick command in order to counteract 
the induce pitch rate bias. It is important to note that the transfer function can be substituted by a 
linear relation between the DIV and the EDIV. 
Assuming a linear relation between the stick input    and the control surface actuation     the 
nominal ranges for the EDIV when a positive roll (       ) rate bias affects the system are 
calculated as follows: 
                  (53) 
   
              (54) 
 
Similarly, for a negative pitch rate bias (       ): 
              (55) 
   
                  (56) 
   
With the new ranges of effective longitudinal stick command, it is possible to calculate the 
corresponding ranges for all the ERVs using the 2-dimensional projections.  
 
4.1.7 Yaw Sensor Bias 
A yaw sensor bias failure flight envelope reduction can be analyzed through the 
following process. The process relies on the specifics of the control system that uses the sensor 
information. The control laws of the aircraft determine a “desired” angular rate response 
determined by a reference model designed to satisfy handling qualities criteria. The flight 
envelope reduction analysis requires the following variables: 
           
         
               ̇  ̇      
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The relationship between DIV and EDIV can be calculated such that: 
        (  ) (57) 
   
in which   represents a second order transfer function obtained from the pitch channel reference 
model. It is possible to avoid the use of a transfer function, if it is not available, by finding a 
linear relation between the DIV and the EDIV.   
As a result of the yaw sensor failure, an undesired yaw rate command is produced in 
order to compensate for the “fake” yaw seen by the controller. In other words, the aircraft will 
rotate in the opposite direction of the sensor bias. This behavior must be compensated using a 
rudder command, reducing the authority of the yaw channel.  The excursion of the directional 
pedal control necessary to compensate for the control law yaw command is equivalent to a bias 
in the form: 
       
  (     ) (58) 
   
in which     is the necessary excursion of the directional commands in order to counteract 
induced yaw rate bias. It is important to note that the transfer function can be substituted by a 
linear relation between the DIV and the EDIV. 
Assuming a linear relation between the stick input    and the control surface actuation 
  , the nominal ranges for the EDIV when a positive roll (       ) rate bias affects the system 
are calculated as follows: 
                  (59) 
   
              (60) 
 
Similarly, for a negative yaw rate bias (       ): 
              (61) 
   
                  (62) 
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With the new ranges of effective directional commands, it is possible to calculate the 
corresponding ranges for all the ERVs using the 2-dimensional projections.  
 
4.1.8 Wing Structural Damage 
The flight envelope reduction estimation for a wing structural failure is discussed next. 
This failure requires more attention due to the shift in center of gravity and also the fact that the 
equilibrium of forces and moments on the body axis is compromised after the failure affects the 
system. It is important to note that the differentiation between left or right wing is negligible. The 
flight envelope reduction analysis requires the following variables: 
              
                   
                             ̇  ̇  ̇          
  For nominal conditions during a steady-state flight, the forces and moments that act on 
the aircraft are shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 21- Forces and Moments on an Aircraft 
z 
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The equilibrium of longitudinal forces and moments in the body axis satisfy the following 
statements: 
 ∑                         
 
(63) 
 
∑                         
 
(64) 
 
∑             
 
(65) 
      (  ) (66) 
   
       (67) 
in which: 
 (      ),  (   ),  (   ),  (   ),   (      ),   (   ),   (   ) 
Let us assume that certain flight conditions namely, Mach number, altitude and flight path angle, 
are required to be unchanged at post-failure conditions. The failure will invariably produce 
changes, or deltas, on all other variables leading to:   
 ∑          (    )    (    )  (    )    (    )      (    ) (68) 
 
 
 
 
∑      (    )    (    )  (    )    (    )      (    ) (69) 
 ∑     (      )  (         ) (70) 
 
 
 
       (  ) (71) 
 
In which    is the distance between the plane of symmetry of the aircraft and the aerodynamic 
center of the wing after failure.  
 The differential lift between wings will produce an undesired rolling moment that must 
be compensated using aileron deflection. In other words, a pseudo-failure of the aileron exists. 
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The aileron deflection required to compensate for the undesired rolling moment can be 
approximated using the balance of rolling moments such that:  
                        (72) 
   
 
      
        
       
 
 
(73) 
where   is the wingspan and   is an alteration factor that depends on how the aileron is affected 
due to the wing failure. For example, if       the aileron is in perfect conditions after the 
failure and its actuation is nominal, and if        the aileron is completely damaged and 
unusable. 
Assuming the relationship with its EDIV: 
         (74) 
   
the nominal lateral control ranges are: 
               (75) 
   
               (76) 
Under stab failure, this becomes: 
          (          ) (77) 
   
          (          ) (78) 
This eventually becomes: 
          (      
        
       
) (79) 
          (      
        
       
) (80) 
   
Now that the ranges for the aileron control are known, it is possible to determine the 
effects of the wing failure on         ̇  ̇     using the 2-dimensional projections.  
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 A similar analysis can be performed for the pitching moment coefficient as well. If the 
alteration is known, the reduction in the longitudinal control authority can be determined using 
the pitching moment balance as follows:  
            (81) 
   
                  (82) 
   
        
    
    
 (83) 
   
The new ranges for   when          are: 
                       (84) 
 
 
             (85) 
Similarly, for        : 
              (86) 
   
                       (87) 
 
Now that the ranges for the stabilator/elevator control are known, it is possible to 
determine the effects of the wing failure on            ̇     using the 2-dimensional 
projections.  
 
4.1.9 Engine Reduced Effectiveness   
 
The reduction estimation of the flight envelope of an aircraft due to engine deficiencies 
can be calculated using the following process. It is important to note that the differentiation 
between left or right control engine is negligible. The flight envelope reduction analysis requires 
the following variables: 
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The relationship between DIV and EDIV can be calculated by a linear function such that: 
     (     ) (88) 
   
in which the suffixes     and     denote the left or right engine and   is a linear function.  
The nominal ranges for the EDIV are calculated as follows: 
        (           )       (89) 
   
        (           )     (90) 
   
where typically            . 
After a failure is present in the system the new ranges for the EDIV can be calculated as follows: 
         (            ) (91) 
   
         (            ) (92) 
   
Note that the minimum values for thrust do not change after a failure. It is important to note that 
the same concept can be applied to a right engine failure with no further modifications to the 
analysis.  
The new calculated ranges of the EDIV are then used to determine the new ranges for all 
pertinent ERVs except for yaw rate. An engine failure will produce an undesired yawing moment 
that needs to be explored with more depth. The undesired yawing moment must be corrected by 
a rudder deflection which subsequently reduces the authority of the yaw command channel. This 
rudder pseudo-failure is a function of the throttle command and can be assumed to be a linear 
relation. Therefore, the total yawing moment can be expressed such that:  
                       (93) 
   
 (           )     (94) 
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Note that for a healthy system the control derivatives satisfy the expression            . On 
the other hand if a failure is present in the system the statement is no longer true.  
 (           )     (95) 
   
Therefore, the rudder actuation necessary to counteract the yawing moment due to an engine 
failure can be calculated through  
 (           )              (96) 
   
     (  )   
(           )
    
   (97) 
   
where      is the rudder deflection necessary to compensate for the undesired yawing moment 
due to an engine failure.  
The relationship with its corresponding EDIV for this pseudo-failure is: 
         (98) 
   
The nominal directional control ranges are: 
               (99) 
   
               (100) 
   
Under stabilator failures, this becomes: 
          (          (  )) (101) 
   
          (          (  )) (102) 
   
and finally: 
          (      
(           )
    
  ) (103) 
   
          (      
(           )
    
  ) (104) 
   
It is important to note that the same concept can be applied to a right engine failure with 
no further modifications to the analysis. Also, the pseudo failure is the same as in the throttle 
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failure case except that the range varies with respect to throttle input   . The new ranges of the 
directional control can be used to determine the effects on yawing moment.  
 
4.2 Flight Envelope Reduction Results  
The flight envelope reduction algorithm was implemented for 8 failures with several 
ranges of severity. The proposed algorithm presents a simple analytical approach to estimate the 
effects on the maneuverability, performance, handling qualities and flight envelope reduction 
under upset conditions. For the most part, the results obtained from the analysis of the simulation 
tests fell within the expected limits. The reduction of relevant variables directly related to the 
flight dynamics characteristics namely angular rates, linear accelerations and angular rate 
accelerations among others are often estimated correctly. On the other hand, the reduction in 
variables such as altitude, velocity, angle of attack and angle of sideslip present more inaccurate 
results.  
It is confirmed that the estimated values obtained from the analytical analysis that define 
the limits of the ERVs are actual bounds of the expected flight envelope reduction for the vast 
majority of ERVs. In other words, the results from the analytical analysis do delimit the flight 
envelope variables when compared with the 2-dimensional projections of the investigated 
selves/non-selves. 
The graphical method used to determine the ranges of ERVs mentioned earlier in this 
chapter was applied to 5 failures.  Examples of this method applied to actual sensor failures are 
presented in figures 22 and 23.  
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Figure 22-Reduction in Roll Rate After Roll Sensor Bias Failure 
 
Figure 23- Reduction in Pitch Rate After Pitch Sensor Bias Failure 
 
It should be noted that the red clusters represent the self and the blue clusters represent 
the non-self. Also, the black points represent the dynamics of the aircraft after a failure.  
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Tables 14 through 18 present the results for the estimated reduced ranges of ERVs for 
several flight test scenarios that include 5 types of failures of varying magnitudes. It should be 
noted that for simplicity and to avoid excessive length the results presented below are just a 
sample set of the investigated failures.   
      Table 14- Estimated Reduced Ranges for a Roll Rate Sensor Bias of 5deg/sec Failure 
ERV Nominal Ranges Estimated Reduced Range 
  (rad/sec) [1.08194, -0.9373] 
[0.9779 +/- 0.018,  
-0.7677+/- 0.018] 
  (rad/sec) [0.0621, -0.0637] 
[0.0237 +/- 0.007,  
-0.0209+/- 0.0015] 
    
(g’s) 
[0.6658, -0.8634] 
[0.159 +/-0.15,  
-0.228 +/-0.15] 
 ̇ (rad/sec2) [3.0897, -2.9513] 
[1.5613 +/-0.31, 
 -1.894 +/- 0.21] 
 ̇ (rad/sec2) [0.1264, -0.1173] 
[0.029 +/-0.008,  
-0.0123 +/-0.008] 
   
(rad) 
[0.1712, -0.1675] 
[0.0173 +/-0.002, 
 -0.0142 +/-0.002] 
   
(rad) 
[0.6027, -1.0177] 
[0.235 +/-0.01,  
-0.355 +/- 0.01] 
 
Table 15- Estimated Reduced Ranges for a Pitch Rate Sensor Bias of 1 deg/sec Failure 
ERV Nominal Range Estimated Reduced Range 
    
(g’s) 
[0.5973, -0.3437] 
[0.2586 +/-0.04, 
 -0.102 +/-0.04] 
    
(g’s) 
[3.0488, -2.4616] 
[2.26 +/- 0.29, 
 -1.376 +/-0.29] 
   
(ft) 
[9929.16, 2012.33] 
[7936.5 +/-1500, 
 2911.5 +/- 700] 
  [0.95, 0.5261] 
[0.916 +/-0.017, 
 0.724 +/-0.047] 
  (ft/sec) [301.32, 157.69] 
[245.33 +/- 43, 
 191.2 +/- 23] 
  (rad/sec) [0.1831, -0.2247] 
[0.0904 +/-0.023,  
-0.125 +/-0.023] 
 ̇ (rad/sec2) [0.3857, -0.3825] 
[0.195 +/-0.12,  
-0.12 +/-0.082] 
   
(rad) 
[0.2339, -0.1013] 
[0.152 +/-0.014,  
-0.059 +/-0.014] 
   
(rad) 
[0.3985, -0.3253] 
[0.253 +/-0.004, 
 -0.127 +/-0.004] 
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Table 16- Estimated Reduced Flight Envelope for Left Throttle Command Stuck at 90% 
Variable Nominal Range Estimated Reduced Range 
   [0.5973, -0.3437] [0.3421,-0.2979] 
   [3.0488, -2.4616] [2.4856,-1.5402] 
  [0.0621, -0.0637] [0.0399,-0.031556] 
  [9929.16, 2012.33] [9927.97,2013.52] 
  [0.95, 0.5261] [0.94961,0.5595] 
  [301.32, 157.69] [291.9707,163.1548] 
  [0.2339, -0.1013] [0.1622,-0.09015] 
  [0.3985, -0.3253] [0.39322,-0.32331] 
 
 
Table 17- Estimated Reduced Flight Envelope for Left Throttle Command Stuck at 60% 
Variable Nominal Range Estimated Reduced Range 
   [0.5973, -0.3437] [0.3715,-0.2157] 
   [3.0488, -2.4616] [2.585,-2.2852] 
  [0.0621, -0.0637] [0.03851,-0.0335] 
  [9929.16, 2012.33] [9881.67,2059.83] 
  [0.95, 0.5261] [0.95016,0.553] 
  [301.32, 157.69] [301.399,171.36] 
  [0.2339, -0.1013] [0.21014,-0.0905] 
  [0.3985, -0.3253] [0.39416,-0.2550] 
 
 
Table 18- Estimated Reduced Flight Envelope for Left Throttle Command Stuck at 10% 
Variable Nominal Range Estimated Reduced Range 
   [0.5973, -0.3437] [0.50607,-0.27689] 
   [3.0488, -2.4616] [2.0128,-2.0703] 
  [0.0621, -0.0637] [0.040149,-0.0466] 
  [9929.16, 2012.33] [9881.659,2214.211] 
  [0.95, 0.5261] [0.9474,0.53141] 
  [301.32, 157.69] [283.662,161.6317] 
  [0.2339, -0.1013] [0.192,-0.094945 
  [0.3985, -0.3253] [0.394,-0.26450] 
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Chapter 5 Neurally-Augmented Detection and Identification  
 
 Previous research efforts in fault tolerant systems have used ANNs as nonlinear 
approximators that rely on analytical redundancies among inputs, states and outputs of a system. 
The ANN used for this efforts are strictly treated as a dynamic system with inputs, outputs, and 
states in which the dynamics of the approximation process are considered an essential part of the 
system. In particular, these ANNs give emphasis to the approximation results rather than the 
approximation process.    The ANNs were designed for real-time applications as part of control 
systems. Thus, the speed, efficiency, overall performance and the computational requirements of 
the ANN code provide a suitable tool for flight test implementation.  
 Former AIS-based FDIE schemes relied on parameters computed by fault tolerant control 
laws augmented with ANNs. This characteristic limits the application of such algorithms only to 
aircraft equipped with such control systems. In this research effort an alternate design of ANNs 
which are not aircraft dependent provides a viable solution. The architecture uses an open-loop 
online training ANNs system that augments a direct adaptive control law design with a “model 
following” architecture. The open-loop characteristic implies that the ANNs are no longer part of 
the control laws. This ensures portability of the FDIE scheme for several platforms regardless of 
their control systems.   
 The ANN’s outputs represent estimates of the angular acceleration on the three body axes 
with proven potential for self/non-self definitions due to their excellent capabilities to capture the 
dynamic fingerprints of upset conditions. In particular, the ANN architecture used in this 
research effort is the “Adaptive Linear Element” (ADALINE) network, which consists of a 
single neuron of the McCulloch-Pitts type.  
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5.1 Model Following Controller 
 
 As mentioned before, a “model following” type of controller is used in order to provide 
inputs to the ANNs that subsequently will output the estimates for angular rates used for the 
definition selves/non-selves projections and finally FDIE. The controller is maintained as an 
open-loop system and it will not serve as a control augmentation mechanism. The architecture of 
the model following is presented. 
 The pilot inputs are expressed in terms of longitudinal, lateral and directional stick/pedal 
displacements: 
                                      
These flight commands are then converted into preliminary command states: 
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(107) 
where       is a roll rate,       is a vertical load factor,       lateral load factor and 
               are stick and pedal gains. 
Next, the commanded angular rates are obtained such that: 
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(110) 
where   is gravity,   is velocity and    is the bank angle.  
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These commanded angular rates are then converted to filtered reference angular rates 
(              )through first and second order transfer functions such that: 
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(113) 
The tracking errors between actual and reference angular rates are given by           in 
which         are calculated. The tracking errors are used to provide proportional, integral 
and derivative compensation.  
Next, the pseudo-controls in terms of acceleration command are calculated. These values are 
only used as inputs the ANN and are obtained through:  
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(116) 
where          are the constant values of proportional-integral-derivative type controller, 
respectively. Since the outputs of the ANN are not used for control purposes, all the parameters 
mentioned before are generic. The difference between nominal and abnormal condition outputs 
is the main variable used for FDIE. 
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5.2 ADALINE Network 
 
 In general an adaptive linear neuron (ADALINE) network consists of a single neuron of 
the McCulloch-Pitts type in which weights integrated in the architecture are determined by delta 
rule also known as the least mean square training law. However, the ADALINE network used in 
this research effort utilizes a steepest descent gradient to minimize the error between 
measurements and estimates. This characteristic allows the system to adapt and update 
constantly. The architecture of the ADALINE network is shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24- ADALINE Network 
 
The ADALINE network approximates a vector signal       as a linear combination of 
  input vectors       during its training phase. For example, assume that      where 
       is a matrix of real numbers that is constantly updated by a steepest descent gradient 
method. Then, the update law results in:  
 
 
 (   )   ( )    ( ) ( )     (   ) 
 
(117) 
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where   is the learning rate,   (   ) is the modification that stabilizes the update law and  
 ( ) is the current estimation error of the form  ( )   ( )    ( ). 
 The inputs to the ANN include pseudo control acceleration commands (        ) 
obtained from the reference model controller, sensor feedback and the previous step network 
outputs (              ). In general, for each channel (pitch, roll and yaw) the ANN’s inputs 
are altitude, velocity, angle of attack and sideslip angle. Furthermore, each channel in particular 
receives the following inputs: 
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Ultimately, for on-line learning the ANN uses PID acceleration errors in the form of: 
 
 
         (          
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(121) 
where 
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Chapter 6 Flight Test 
 
 An initial performance analysis of the proposed FDIE solution has been assessed through 
flight tests.  A set of two nominal flights that included figure-8-maneuvers as well as control 
surface doublets in all three axes were performed in order to capture the entire flight envelope 
dynamics of the test aircraft. The platform used for this experimentation was the Skywalker RC 
aircraft instrumented with an APM 2.5 micro controller.  The RC aircraft was flown manually by 
a pilot on the ground and the maneuvers were implemented in a sequential order. The nominal 
flight tests consisted of the following stages: 
1. Manual flight until an altitude of 80 meters 
2. Trim flight at constant speed 
3. Figure 8 maneuver 
4. Elevator Doublet 
5. Figure 8 maneuver 
6. Aileron Doublet 
7. Figure 8 maneuver 
8. Rudder Doublet  
9. Figure 8 maneuver 
 
The flight test sequence was performed twice and the data were saved into a flash 
memory for later processing. The data was recorded at a rate of 50Hz and included angular rates, 
linear accelerations, neural network angular rate estimations, reference model commands, Euler 
angles, altitude, stick inputs and velocity. A total of 21 features were recorded. Using Equation 
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(1) it can be determined that a total of 210 Self/Non-Self projections can be generated for the 
performance assessment through flight test implementation. The reduced flight envelope limits 
of the Skywalker as well as the length of the flights yield a reduced amount of data points. This 
should be taken into consideration during the generation of projections in order to obtain proper 
coverage of the Self.  
 For validation purposes, four different types of failures were injected into the system at 
later flights in order to capture the dynamic fingerprint of abnormal conditions on the test 
platform. The failures investigated in flight test included low and high magnitude aileron 
failures. The failures were injected manually by the pilot through a PWM signal sent from an RC 
transmitter. Once a failure was injected, the sequence of maneuvers presented above was 
attempted by the pilot.   Table 19 presents the injected failures in the system.  
 
Table 19- Failures Injected in Flight Tests 
Failure #1 Left Aileron Locked at Wings Level Trim 
Failure #2 Right Aileron Locked at Wings Level Trim 
Failure #3 Left Aileron Locked at Trim during Bank Turn 
Failure #4 Right Aileron Locked at Trim during Bank Turn 
 
6.1 Test Platform 
 
The RC airplane chosen for experimentation was the “New Skywalker 1880”. This 
platform offers a stable and low-cost system that is able to satisfy the needs of the flight tests. 
Figure 25 shows the actual system used for the flight tests. This platform was used in previous 
projects for which system identification techniques were performed. The physical characteristics 
of the system are presented in Table 20. 
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Figure 25- Skywalker 1880 RC 
 
Table 20- Skywalker Dimensions and Mass Properties 
Wing Area (m
2
) 0.41143 
Wing MAC (m) 0.22647 
Wingspan (m) 1.88 
Horizontal Tail Span (m) 0.5626 
Horizontal Tail MAC (m) 17.1 
Vertical Tail Span (m) 0.244 
Vertical Tail MAC (m) 19.5 
Total Length (m) 1.183 
Weight (Kg) 0.9525 
 
6.2 Hardware Instrumentation  
 
 The Skywalker 1880 was equipped with a set of analog and digital sensors that provide 
essential variables for the generation of Selves and Non-selves. Primarily, the onboard 
microcontroller is an APM 2.5 with an “Atmel ATMEGA 2560” processor. The APM 2.5 board 
includes embedded sensors such as an IMU, magnetometer and a 4MB data flash chip as well as 
digital and analog ports for GPS, telemetry and a pitot tube sensor.  Figure 26 shows the APM 
and the setup inside the fuselage of the Skywalker. 
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Figure 26- Onboard APM 2.5 
 
6.2.1 APM 2.5 
 The Ardupilot Mega (APM) 2.5 is an out-of-the-shelf low-cost autopilot solution 
produced by 3D Robotics. Its dimensions are approximately 66x40 mm. and with the enclosure it 
weighs approximately 20 grams. It uses an 8-bit, 16Mhz  “Atmel AT Mega 2560” processor 
which has 54 digital I/O pins for which 14 can be used for PWM signals. Figure 27 shows a 
close view of the board.  
 
 
Figure 27- APM 2.5 Close View 
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6.2.2 InvenSense MPU-6000 Inertial Sensor 
 The MPU-600 is a 6-axis motion tracking device. It combines a 3-axis gyroscope and a 3-
axis accelerometer in a 4x4x0.9mm QFN footprint and it communicates through a serial interface 
in an IC2 protocol. Figure 28 shows an image of the MPU-6000 inertial sensor. 
 
 
Figure 28- MPU-6000 
 
6.2.3 MEAS Switzerland MS5611 Barometric Pressure Sensor 
This barometric pressure sensor offers a high resolution altimeter sensor with SPI and 
I2C bus interfaces up to 20MHz. It offers a factory calibrated sensor with a resolution of 10 cm. 
and its dimensions corresponds to a 5x3x1mm QFN footprint. Figure 29- shows an image of the 
MS5611 sensor. 
 
 
Figure 29- MS5611-01BA093 Barometric Pressure Sensor 
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6.2.4 Data Flash 
The data flash card is a 4Mb chip embedded in the APM 2.5 board. Previous efforts have 
shown that recording 20 floating point parameters at 50Hz it is possible to record approximately 
17 minutes of data recording. Figure 30 shows an image of the flash chip on the APM 2.5 board. 
 
 
Figure 30- Data Flash Memory Chip 
 
6.2.5 MediaTek MT3329 GPS 
 The MT3329 is a 66 channel single chip solution with a binary output protocol with an 
update rate of 10Hz. Its sensitivity can be up to -165dB tracking, a position accuracy of less than 
3meters and USB/UART interfaces. Its dimensions are 38x16x7.8mm and it weighs 9.45g. 
Figure 31 shows an image the GPS. 
 
 
Figure 31- MediaTek MT3329 
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6.2.6 Freescale MPXV7002DP Differential Pressure Sensor 
 This analog sensor was connected directly to a miniature pitot tube located on the right 
wing. Its maximum rating for pressure is 2kPa at 60
o 
C. This sensor provides true air speed 
measurements that are used for the definitions of selves. Figure 32 shows the analog sensor and 
the pitot tube. 
 
 
Figure 32- Unassembled Pitot tube and Pressure Sensor 
 
6.2.7 Spektrum DX7s RC Transmitter 
 The DX7s is a 7-channel, 2.4 GHz remote control transmitter and receiver used for 
manual control of the aircraft and control of aileron failures in the system. Five channels were 
used for the control of ailerons, rudder, throttle and elevator and a sixth channel commanded the 
aileron to lock at a given position. Figure 33- shows an image of the RC equipment.   
 
 
Figure 33- DX7s Transmitter and Receiver 
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6.2.8 Thunder Power TP3300-5SPL25 5 Cell LiPo Battery 
 The power source chosen for the system was a G6 Pro Lite Thunder Power 5 cell LiPo 
18.5V battery. Figure 34- shows an image of the battery.  
 
Figure 34- Thunder Power LiPo Battery 
 
6.2.9 Turnigy D3542/6 Brushless Motor 
 The electric motor chosen for the Skywalker was a 1000Kv RPM Turnigy brushless 
motor. Its maximum current is 38A and it has a maximum power of 665W. Its weight is 
approximately 130g. and it dimension are 35x42mm with a shaft diameter of 5mm. Figure 35 
shows the motor used. 
 
Figure 35- Turnigy Brushless Motor 
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6.3 Simulink Models  
  
The onboard microcontroller has the ability to be targeted through Simulink and the APM 
2.0 Block set for Simulink. This feature provides a great advantage for any effort involving low 
cost autopilots and sensor fusions boards. Several Simulink models including model reference 
control, artificial neural networks and Kalman filter models, were designed in Simulink and later 
loaded into the APM 2.5 board for flight test implementation. Figure 36 shows the top level of 
the Simulink model loaded into the APM 2.5 board.   
 
Figure 36- Simulink Model Top Level 
 
In general, the Simulink model allows the APM board to read several sensors embedded 
in the board while recording flight test data in real time. Once the data is recorded in the flash 
memory, it can be downloaded and processed off-line for the generation of projections. Most of 
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the features are obtained from the sensors embedded in the onboard computer. On the other 
hand, the bank and pitch angles as well as the ANN and model reference control outputs are 
generated by separate Simulink models. The following sections will briefly describe the 
Simulink models for the mentioned systems. 
 
6.3.1 APM 2.5 Sensors 
 It is possible to auto-generate code through the Run-On-Target-Hardware tool in the 
Simulink environment into the APM 2.5 board.  The APM 2.0 Simulink blockset allows users to 
read data from the sensors embedded in the board, command PWM signals to servos and to run 
guidance, navigation and control algorithms. Figure 37 shows the library mentioned before.  
 
Figure 37- APM 2.0 Blockset 
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 This library allows users to read the sensors embedded in the microcontroller. Therefore, 
a Simulink model that reads the data from such sensors was generated and loaded into the 
onboard computer. Figure 38 shows a sample model of the sensors. 
 
 
Figure 38-Simulink Sensor Model 
6.3.2 Kalman Filter 
 In previous efforts, the Skywalker 1880 platform was used as an autonomous platform. 
For this effort, a sensor fusion solution was developed. A discrete Kalman filter was designed in 
Simulink in order to determine bank and pitch angles of the platform. The Kalman filter received 
inputs from a complementary filter that integrated data from the gyroscopes and the 
accelerometer. The Kalman filter demonstrated excellent performance and accuracy in the 
estimation of the desired Euler angles. Based on these characteristics, the estimator was included 
in the Simulink model with the objective to generate important variables for the definition of 
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Self/Non-self projections. Figure 39 shows a Simulink model with the basic architecture of the 
Kalman filter implementation.   
 
Figure 39- Kalman Filter Architecture 
 
6.3.3 Model Reference and ANN 
 As mentioned in Chapter 5, a model reference controller and ANNs were incorporated 
into the system in order to generate features for the definition of projections. The Simulink 
model presents a relatively complex architecture that will not be shown in detail for simplicity. 
Regardless, Figure 40 presents the top level architecture of the model reference-artificial neural 
network model (MR+ANN).  
 
Figure 40- MR+ANN Top Level Architecture 
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 The ANN used was an ADALINE network. The design requires that eight different 
variables are input to the network. Figure 37 shows the Simulink model of a pitch channel neural 
network estimator.   
 
Figure 41- ADALINE Simulink Model 
   
6.4 Flight Test Results  
 
As mentioned before, two nominal flights and four failure flights were performed. A total 
of 38 different channels were recorded into the flash memory. Out of those, only 21 were 
selected for the definition of projections. Considering that only 2-dimensional projections were 
generated, a total of 210 projections are possible. Table 21 presents the features that were 
recorded and selected for projection definition. 
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Table 21- Flight Test Features 
        
      V 
     H 
           
           
          
         
 
Once the 210 projection were defined, it was decided that projections that contained 
variables related to the inertial reference frame (i.e. heading, altitude ground speed) were not 
necessary for detection of abnormal conditions. Therefore, 153 projections were tested against 
flight test data in order to determine the detection performance of the generated selves. The 
selves analyzed the data from four different failure flights. The analysis determined that 30 
different self projections were able to capture the dynamic fingerprint of abnormal conditions. 
Table 22 presents these projections.  
Table 22- Skywalker Self Projections 
Self# Features Self# Features 
1           16        
2           17        
3        18         
4        19      
5        20      
6          21      
7          22        
8          23        
9         24      
10         25      
11         26       
12         27       
13         28      
14         29      
15         30       
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The selected projections obtained an average 21.11% and 30.68% DR for ailerons stuck 
at wings level trim and ailerons stuck during a bank maneuver respectively. These detection rate 
perceived seems to be low. However, due the nature of the flight tests and the process of the 
detection analysis it is expected to obtain such results for individual selves. For example, for a 
wing level aileron locked a trim, the pilot injects the failure into the system manually when the 
aircraft is flying hands free. At the moment of injection it is considered that a failure is present in 
the system. Nevertheless, the system will not perceive a change in the dynamics until the pilot 
attempt a new maneuver.  Table 23 presents the DR  and FA rate of a sample set of projections. 
Table 23- Detection Rate and False Alarm Rate for 4 Failures 
 
Right Aileron 
Locked 
at Wings Level 
Right Aileron 
Locked 
at Bank Maneuver 
Left Aileron 
Locked 
at Wings Level 
Left Aileron 
Locked 
at Bank 
Maneuver 
Self# FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR 
1 0.00 25.59 0.00 28.67 0.00 12.40 0.00 23.75 
12 0.00 25.08 0.00 34.77 0.00 19.15 0.00 34.11 
13 0.00 32.46 0.00 36.36 0.00 31.55 0.00 39.25 
15 0.00 24.56 0.00 44.10 0.00 14.75 0.00 25.46 
22 0.00 10.15 0.00 15.59 0.00 11.28 0.00 30.52 
30 0.00 20.56 0.00 23.33 0.00 26.20 0.00 32.23 
Average 0.00 23.07 0.00 30.47 0.00 19.22 0.00 30.89 
 
As shown before the individual selves present a low DR but if they are integrated into a 
single detection mechanism the DR improves greatly. For example, if the 30 selves selected are 
used for failure detection, then the DR percentage improves to 71.86% and 90.68% for ailerons 
stuck at wings level trim and ailerons stuck during a bank maneuver, respectively. This 
configuration is able to obtain a significant improvement in DR but it also increases the FA rates 
approximately to 5.2%. For this reason, other configurations were tested in order to obtain an 
acceptable tradeoff between DR and FA.  
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Two more configurations of selves were tested. The second configuration utilizes only 
the 6 selves shown in Table 23. This configuration obtained an average of 43.26% and 58.27% 
DR for ailerons stuck at wings level trim and ailerons stuck during a bank maneuver 
respectively, with FA rates of approximately 1% for both cases. The third configuration of selves 
utilizes only projections that have 0% FA rate for each failure disregarding FA for other types of 
failures. This configuration guarantees that the FA rate will be low and it also offer the 
possibility to use this method for identification purposes. The third configuration presents an 
average of 59.57% and 77.25% DR for ailerons stuck at wings level trim and ailerons stuck 
during a bank maneuver, respectively and less than 0.5% FA. Table 24 presents a summary of 
these results. 
Table 24- Detection Rates and False Alarms for 3 Configurations of Selves 
 
R. Aileron Locked 
at Wings  
Level 
R. Aileron Locked 
at  
Bank Maneuver 
Left Aileron Locked 
at  
Wings Level 
Left Aileron Locked 
at  
Bank Maneuver 
Method FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR 
1 5.2 74.34 1.54 90.01 4.3 69.39 2.33 91.36 
2 0.52 47.17 0.12 60.23 1.0 39.35 0.02 56.32 
3 0.3 61.18 0.0 80.94 0.2 57.97 0.0 73.56 
 
It should be noted that the four failures investigated in flight test are considered to be low 
magnitude. Also, the duration of all flights with an injected failure lasted approximately 20 
seconds. These two characteristics yield small sets of data in which great portions of data fall 
inside the self which subsequently led to the low detection rates presented in Table 24.  More 
importantly, the detection rate calculation is considered to be very conservative for the nature of 
the test flights under failure. Each failure flight test is considered to start as soon as the pilot 
injects the failure and end when the switch is moved back to nominal position. However, the 
dynamics of the aircraft will not change until the pilot commands maneuvers that require the 
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actuation of the damaged control surface. In other words, a failure is not visible to the 
mechanism until the flight attitude is not at trim condition.  
Table 23 shows that single projections can only obtain a maximum of 30.89% detection 
rate. Nevertheless, when the projections are integrated as a single mechanism the DR increases 
greatly (see Table 24). This occurs because each projection at certain time periods of the flight 
test only captures abnormal dynamics when excited by certain maneuvers and commands. On the 
other hand, integrating several projections allows the mechanism to capture abnormal dynamic 
fingerprints at different periods of time during the flight tests. Figures 42-44 show the detection 
activity of single projections and Figure 45-46 shows the detection activity when the projections 
are integrated into a single mechanism. The value of 1 represents that a detector was been 
activated and alternatively a value of 0 determines that none of the detectors have been activated. 
The first 5 seconds are nominal flight test conditions while the remainder of the time corresponds 
to flight test data under an upset condition.        
 
Figure 42- Self #1 Detector Activity for Left Aileron Locked at Bank Maneuver 
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Figure 43- Self #17 Detector Activity for Left Aileron Locked at Bank Maneuver 
 
 
Figure 44- Self #18 Detector Activity for Left Aileron Locked at Bank Maneuver 
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Figure 45- Method 2 Detector Activity for Left Aileron Locked at Bank Maneuver 
 
 
Figure 46- Method 1 Detector Activity for Left Aileron Locked at Bank Maneuver 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions  
 
A set of comprehensive algorithms inspired by the artificial immune system paradigm 
capable of performing detection, identification and evaluation of aircraft subsystems failures has 
been developed and tested. The performance of the mechanism has been assessed through 
simulation and flight tests showing excellent performance in all phases of the process. The 
aircraft health management framework presented provides the premises for an integral and 
comprehensive solution to the problem of aircraft subsystems FDIE. The simulation tests were 
implemented for a fighter aircraft while the flight test experimentation was performed on a RC aircraft.  
The architecture of the mechanism presented is inspired in the artificial immune system paradigm 
within a hierarchical multi-self strategy. Vast amounts of flight test data were obtained from a 6DOF 
flight simulator located in WVU. A total of 496 2-dimensional Self/Non-Self projections were generated 
for FDIE purposes. The Cluster Set Union Method for antibodies/detectors generation is presented in this 
thesis. Furthermore, the failure detection capabilities of each projection were tested within the 
Matlab/Simulink Environment. A total of 183 projections exhibited excellent results with detection rates 
reaching up to 99%  while false alarm rate were kept down to 0%.  
A Structured Non-Self Approach for the identification and direct evaluation methodology is 
presented. This methodology is based on an arrangement of non-self projections and intends to reduce 
computational efforts for real-time application. It offers a simple yet reliable algorithm capable of 
correctly identifying specific failure types, failed subsystems as well as the severity of the failure 
affecting the system. 
Furthermore, an indirect evaluation algorithm for the estimation of reduced flight envelope 
variables at post-failure conditions is presented. This analytical process takes advantage of the graphical 
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representation of the dynamics of the aircraft to determine the reduction in performance, maneuverability 
and other limits of investigated aircraft parameters.  
The mechanism presented in this thesis is also implemented in flight test. A Skywalker RC 
aircraft was instrumented with an APM 2.5 micro controller that has embedded digital sensors that 
provided essential variables for the definition of self/non-self projections. The onboard computer was 
loaded with a Kalman filter, a model reference controller and an ANN Simulink model. Four different 
failures were injected during flight. The detection process was performed offline and presented acceptable 
detection rates and false alarms rates.  
 
7.1 Future Work  
Future work regarding this topic includes: 
 Flight test implementation with other aircraft systems 
 Injection of more severe failures during flight tests 
 Use of more powerful computers for online detection and identification experimentation 
 Use this approach for aircraft crash investigation  in addition to classical methods 
 Utilize an “Extended Minimum Resource Allocation Network” in parallel with the 
ADALINE network 
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